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Do Sagebrush Rebels Have a Colorable Claim? The Space Between 
Parochialism and Exclusion in Federal Lands Management 
 
Ann M. Eisenberg* 
 
This Article asks whether the troubling nature of the Sagebrush 
Rebellion and similar movements (e.g., their violence, anti-
environmentalism, and racist overtones) has made us overly dismissive 
of a kernel of truth in their complaints.  Commentators often 
acknowledge that federal lands management may be “unfair” to local 
communities, but the ethical and legal characteristics of the unfairness 
concern remain under-explored.  Although the Sagebrush Rebellion and 
federal lands communities are far from synonymous, substantial overlap 
between the complaints and demands of Sagebrush Rebels and the 
complaints and demands of many regional local (and state) governments 
suggests that to explore the one necessitates exploring the other.  Yet, the 
extreme tactics of unsavory figures like Ammon and Cliven Bundy stand 
to overshadow real problems in the region.  To search for the potential 
kernel of truth, I therefore apply a “pro se analysis” to complaints about 
unfairness in the public lands regime vis-à-vis communities near federal 
lands in order to transcend rhetorical blind spots and discern the 
strongest “colorable claims” amidst the noise.  After dispensing with 
land transfer advocates’ common legal arguments, I conclude that a 
more substantial basis in ethical and legal principle than is generally 
recognized supports the idea that communities near public lands 
experience injustices and may be entitled to a form of input over land use 
(though not through formal law).  To categorize these “claims” in a 
legally digestible way, I articulate three ethically and legally principled 
“theories” on behalf of the disgruntled: (1) an Exclusion Theory; (2) a 
Reliance Theory; and (3) a Public Trust Doctrine Theory.   
 
This Article builds upon an earlier project, Alienation and Reconciliation 
in Social-Ecological Systems,1 which argues that cultural rifts and 
procedural flaws have contributed to alienating large segments of the 
country from environmentalism and the federal government, to the 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law.  I 
am grateful to William Boyd, Bruce Huber, Alexandra Klass, Seth Mayer, Lisa 
Pruitt, Jesse Richardson, and Emily Suski for their helpful comments on earlier 
drafts.  All errors are my own. 
1. Ann M. Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation in Social-
Ecological Systems, 47 ENVTL. L. 127 (2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2930217. 
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detriment of climate change law and policy, and that adaptive 
governance and collaborative decisionmaking may stand to remedy some 
of these issues.  Like in Alienation and Reconciliation, I conclude here 
that adaptive governance or a similar approach may be the appropriate 
avenue for mitigating the concerns outlined.  This discussion thus serves 
not only to shed light on a longstanding tension in federal lands law and 
policy, but also to engage and illuminate the anti-government, anti-
environmental sentiment that has percolated throughout the country for 
decades.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the polarizing debate over federal land ownership, consensus 
among environmental and natural resources law scholars, federal courts, 
and the majority of the population holds that public lands should remain 
federally owned.2  Supporters of the opposing school of thought—the 
Movement to Transfer Public Lands, encompassing such sub-movements 
as the Sagebrush Rebellion, the Wise Use Movement, and the County 
Supremacy Movement—all maintain some version of the narrative that 
federal ownership is illegal or mismanaged, and thus, the land should be 
transferred to the states or counties, or privatized outright.3  Falling 
                                                 
2. Andrea Hungerford, “Custom and Culture” Ordinances: Not a 
Wise Move for the Wise Use Movement, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 457 (1995); Scott W. 
Reed, The County Supremacy Movement: Mendacious Myth Marketing, 30 IDAHO L. 
REV. 525 (1994).  
3. See Marshall Swearingen & Kate Schimel, Timeline: A Brief 
History of the Sagebrush Rebellion, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://www.hcn.org/articles/a-history-of-the-sagebrush-rebellion?utm_source=wcn1 
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somewhere in between these two viewpoints are proponents of 
“devolved collaboration” or “devolution”—the policy of empowering 
local communities and constituencies with joint decisionmaking input.4  
Some insist that this approach is necessary, while according to others, it 
is a constitutionally questionable “ideological fad” or simply an alternate 
branding for the Sagebrush Rebellion.5 
In addition to concerns about process and outcomes, part of the 
impetus driving devolution and collaboration proponents is that federal 
lands are not always managed in a way that seems completely “fair” to 
local communities and constituents.6  The unfairness proposition is not 
novel.7  However, the precise parameters of the unfairness proposition 
remain under-explored.  That is, most arguments in favor of 
                                                                                                             
&utm_medium=email (discussing “Posse Comitatus, a movement whose members 
hold the county sheriff to be the highest law of the land”); Hillary Hoffman, Demand 
Management, Climate Change, and the Livestock Grazing Crisis in the Great Basin, 
GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L., Winter 2016, at 22 (“In the 1980s and 1990s, 
the Sagebrush Rebellion was repackaged and reinvigorated as the County 
Supremacy, or County Home Rule, Movement.”); J.M. Berger, What Do the Oregon 
Ranchers Really Believe?, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Jan. 10, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/oregon-ranchers-radical-ideology-
213514 (discussing Wise Use movement, “a conservative ideology that was popular 
within militia circles during the 1980s and 1990s and is critical of government 
environmental protections”). 
4. Ted Fellman, Collaboration and the Beaverhead-Deerlodge 
Partnership: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 30 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 
79, 82 (2009) (discussing many versions of collaborative decisionmaking, including 
collaborative conservation, cooperative conservation, environmental conflict 
resolution, multi-party negotiations, and consensus-building). 
5. See George C. Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources: A 
Summary Case Against Devolved Collaboration, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 602 (1999); Jim 
Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative 
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997); Fellman, supra note 4, at 
81–82 (noting difficulty of defining “collaboration” and details of implementing it, 
as well as diverging views that collaboration is either the “promise of a better future” 
or illegal undermining of NEPA); cf. Michelle Bryan et al., Cause for Rebellion? 
Examining How Federal Land Management Agencies and Local Governments 
Collaborate on Land Use Planning, 6 J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1, 4–5 (2015) 
[hereinafter Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?] (describing state and local efforts to 
coordinate with federal agency planning as more like “a counter-punch demanding 
that federal agencies make federal land use planning subservient to local planning”). 
6. See Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 20 (arguing that 
federal agencies’ planning practices give local governments “cause for rebellion”).   
7. Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An 
Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 853 
(1982). 
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collaboration have been based either in some intuitive sense of unfairness 
or in pragmatic concerns about effective results and efficiency.8   
Taking a different approach, this Article examines the unfairness 
concern through a normative lens, directly questioning why the current 
administrative regime may be unfair to locals, beyond a general sense of 
exclusion or injustice.9  It asks whether a legally or ethically principled 
case can be made that the local public suffers some form of injustice as a 
result of federal lands management, and whether legal or ethical norms 
suggest that communities proximal to public lands may be entitled to 
some form of participation in decisionmaking over those lands.10 
This line of inquiry is sensitive and complex, and strong 
affirmative answers to questions about the potential need for local 
empowerment might raise some hackles.  First, many fear that “local 
participation” translates in practice to undue influence by powerful, 
private local constituents.11  This type of commandeering could be said 
                                                 
8. Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or 
Layered Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save 
Our Public Lands?, 14 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 449, 450 (2008) 
[hereinafter Babcock, Dual Regulation] (noting ecologists’ recognition that 
consultation and collaboration among multiple governing authorities is necessary to 
make natural resources management effective); Fellman, supra note 4, at 84 (“[The] 
simple answer to the question of why collaborate is that ‘collaboration can lead to 
better decisions that are more likely to be implemented and, at the same time, better 
prepare agencies and communities for future challenges.’  The long answer is that 
collaboration builds understanding through information sharing, which allows 
agencies to learn from and educate the public and manage uncertainty through joint 
research and fact-finding.”). 
9. Cf. Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting 
Theory, Policy, and Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1177–78 
(2005) (discussing philosophical bases for policy of devolution, primarily civic 
republicanism). 
10. Allyson Barker et al., The Role of Collaborative Groups in Federal 
Land and Resource Management: A Legal Analysis, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 67, 141 (2003) (“The organic acts governing the four principle land 
management agencies—the BLM, the NPS, the USFS, and the FWS—all contain 
language encouraging agencies to cooperate with the public affected by the 
agencies’ decisions.”). 
11. Id. at 67 (“Critics of collaborative groups, however, argue that this 
optimistic view of their value overlooks some serious flaws. To the extent 
that collaborative groups will be dominated by local participants, they may reflect 
the economic interests of the few rather than the public at large for whose interest 
the public lands are maintained.”); see also Dave Owen, Regional Federal 
Administration, UCLA L. REV. 63.1, 58–121 (2016) (questioning assumption of 
federal centralization in Washington, D.C.); but see Babcock, Dual Regulation, 
supra note 8, at 451–52 (suggesting that cattle and timber barons who benefited from 
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to replace the original injustice (unfairness to local communities) with 
other types of injustice (e.g., the subjugation of indigenous or 
conservationist concerns to commodity producers).12  Second, just as 
formal law does not support a mass land transfer, existing provisions for 
public participation and local-federal collaboration are limited.13  The 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act (“FLPMA”), and agencies’ organic acts, 
regulations, and guidance provide for public participation or local-federal 
collaboration in decisionmaking.14  However, these provisions typically 
do not require collaboration, or where they do, they remain highly 
discretionary.15  Courts have on occasion afforded local governments 
remedies for procedural deficiencies, but litigation in this vein does not 
appear to be common.16     
Another concern is that a fairness-based case for devolution ends 
up resembling some aspects of transfer advocates’ rhetoric.  To take a 
stance in favor of the “local” in this context risks perceptions of agreeing 
with unpopular characters like Ammon or Cliven Bundy, or otherwise 
advocating parochialism.17  These most recent spokesmen for the 
                                                                                                             
nineteenth century paradigm “are giving way to multiple public lands . . . diverse 
communities loosely bound together in a patchwork of shared interests, occupations, 
and geographic locations, not by a single philosophy of commodity extraction”). 
12. Cf. Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY, no. 3, 
1997, at 347, available at http://faculty.virginia.edu/lsanders/SB617_01.pdf 
(discussing “a few suspicious antidemocratic associations” with deliberation). 
13. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 
(2012); Federal Land Policy & Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012). 
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1701(a)(8); 602 FW 
1—Refuge Planning Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (June 21, 2000), 
http://www.fws.gov/policy/602fw1.html [hereinafter FWS Refuge Planning 
Overview]; 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b); NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2, 2.2 
(2006), available at http://www.nps.gov/policy/mp2006.pdf [hereinafter NPS 
MANAGEMENT POLICIES]; Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 5–12 
(discussing provisions for local-federal collaboration in BLM, USFWS, USFS, and 
NPS). 
15. Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 6 (NEPA regulations 
do not require agencies to designate local governments with “cooperating agency” 
status necessary to collaborate formally under NEPA, and designation decision is not 
judicially reviewable.). 
16. See id. at 7; cf. Am. Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt, 534 F. Supp. 923 
(C.D. Cal. 1981); Yount v. Salazar, No. CV11-8171, 2013 WL 93372, at *1 (D. 
Ariz. Jan. 8, 2013). 
17. Cf. Keiter, supra note 9, at 1179 (discussing concern in devolved 
decisionmaking that “parochial interests may well trump the national interest in the 
affected lands and resources”); Joseph Sax, Do Communities Have Rights?  The 
National Parks as a Laboratory of New Ideas, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 499, 501 (1984) 
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Sagebrush Rebellion have been the most prominent public figures raising 
arguments closest to this idea, insisting that federal management is 
“tyrannical,” unjust, and oppressive of local economic interests.18  To 
advocate localism thus raises the specter of complicity in a movement 
flavored by populism, racism, and anti-environmentalism.19  Especially 
in light of the current political climate, a hardline response to transfer 
advocates’ complaints—insisting that federal agencies protect public 
resources for all Americans and try their best to pursue local 
collaboration only by virtue of their altruism—is predictably appealing to 
those of us who prioritize the environment.20 
Recognizing that the Sagebrush Rebellion and related 
movements pose a variety of risks to public welfare—including the 
likelihood that they are a façade of grassroots rage serving to mask a 
political and corporate agenda to privatize public lands21—this Article 
asks whether the movements’ troubling character has made the public 
and scholarly discourse overly dismissive of a kernel of truth within their 
complaints.  Most of their claims can be easily dispensed with; their legal 
                                                                                                             
[hereinafter Sax, Do Communities Have Rights?] (discussing anti-localism trends in 
American law stemming from localism’s tie to parochialism, and how “[a]mong the 
most familiar instances of demands for local autonomy are, of course, the ‘States’ 
rights’ movement, tainted by its association with slavery and the more recent 
resistance to civil rights; local know-nothingism, evidenced by periodic assaults on 
the rights to learn, teach and read; and by the unending economic efforts of states to 
discriminate against interstate commerce”). 
18. Ashley Fantz, Oregon Standoff: What the Armed Group Wants and 
Why, CNN (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/04/us/oregon-wildlife-
refuge-what-bundy-wants. 
19. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Clive Bundy on Blacks: Are They Better Off 
as Slaves?, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/post-politics/wp/2014/04/24/cliven-bundy-on-blacks-are-they-better-off-as-
slaves/?utm_term=.12cf3756456a. 
20. Cf. John Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics 
and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317, 353 (1980) (“I am not so enamored 
of federal ownership that I will admit to the infallibility of federal land management. 
. . . To the extent that the sagebrush rebellion represents public dismay at genuinely 
insensitive and misguided federal attitudes, it may well succeed in enhancing the 
federal government’s appreciation of state and local concerns.”). 
21. Brad Knickerbocker, Sagebrush Rebels Take on Uncle Sam, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jan. 3, 1996), http://www.csmonitor.com/1996/ 
0103/03011.html (discussing environmentalists’ and other critics’ stance that Wise 
Use and Sagebrush Rebellion are a front for corporate natural resource extractors); 
James McCarthy, First World Political Ecology: Lessons from the Wise Use 
Movement, 34 ENV’T & PLAN. 1281, 1282 (2002); Debra L. Donahue, Western 
Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721 (2005) 
(discussing “cowboy myth” in public lands debates).  
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arguments do not hold water and their facts are often wrong.22  Yet, 
scholars have acknowledged that it is possible that Sagebrush Rebellion-
like flare-ups represent sincere, widespread regional frustration about 
arbitrary federal lands management.23   
To search for the kernel of truth, this Article examines transfer 
advocates’ rhetoric to discern whether a “colorable claim” can be found 
amidst the allegations centered on federal injustices.  The framing of this 
analytical exercise is inspired by federal, state, and administrative courts’ 
equitable policy of liberally construing pro se filings and engaging in a 
more searching inquiry where litigants are unrepresented.24  According to 
this doctrine, courts are more likely to take an active look into 
unrepresented litigants’ allegations in order to determine whether any 
meaningful claims could reasonably be construed.25  Using an analogous 
lens here, the analysis seeks to look past the incorrectness of the 
arguments transfer advocates raise in order to determine whether theories 
with a more legitimate thrust, albeit not cognizable in law, could be 
discerned.26  The purpose is not to search for overlooked legal 
arguments, but to assess whether some reasonable articulation of 
ethically or legally principled wrong could be on the side of those crying 
foul. 
                                                 
22. See, e.g., Bryce Gray, No, Federal Lands Transfers Are Not in the 
Constitution, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/ 
legal-experts-oregon-militants-land-transfer-advocates-misguided-on-constitution. 
23. Leshy, supra note 20, at 354; Babbitt, supra note 7, at 861 
(contemplating whether Sagebrush Rebels’ “real objective is, as they claim, to 
eliminate arbitrary, unreasonable, and heavy-handed federal regulation”); 
Knickerbocker, supra note 21 (“Supporters claim [Wise Use/Sagebrush] is truly a 
grassroots effort involving thousands of individuals and families across the rural 
West trying to protect their property rights.”). 
24. See Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2009). 
25. See id.; Michael Correll, Finding the Limits of Equitable Liberality: 
Reconsidering the Liberal Construction of Pro Se Appellate Briefs, 35 VT. L. REV. 
863 (2011); Edward M. Holt, How to Treat ‘Fools’: Exploring the Duties Owed to 
Pro Se Litigants in Civil Cases, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 167, 171 (2001). 
26. Gordon v. Crouchley, 554 F. Supp. 796, 797 (D.R.I. 1982) (“[T]he 
Court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and Haines v. Kerner . . . will scrutinize the 
pleadings of a non-lawyer appearing pro se with especial care to determine if among 
the dabblings, some colorable claim exists.”); cf. Alexandra B. Klass, Response 
Essay: The Personhood Rationale and Its Impact on the Durability of Private 
Claims to Public Property, 103 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 41, 45 (2014) (because claims of 
adverse possession on federal lands fail, “why even talk about adverse possession or 
prescriptive easements in the context of federal lands?  In my view, it is relevant 
because one of the primary policy reasons behind the doctrine of adverse possession, 
the personhood rationale, may help explain the durability of private claims to public 
property.”). 
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Several considerations suggest this analysis is worthwhile.  First, 
this issue is symptomatic of a larger cultural and political divide in the 
United States today.  Themes relevant to the Sagebrush Rebellion have 
received more mainstream attention since Donald Trump’s election to 
the presidency—the urban-rural divide, white populism, and income 
inequality, for instance.27  The discussion here builds upon an earlier 
article in Environmental Law, entitled Alienation and Reconciliation in 
Social-Ecological Systems, which argues that cultural rifts and 
procedural flaws have contributed to alienating large segments of the 
country from environmentalism and the federal government, to the 
detriment of climate change law and policy.28  Although the current 
presidential administration has cast doubt on the relevance of much of 
environmental and administrative law scholarship,29 this discussion uses 
the “pro se analysis” lens in order to transcend cultural and rhetorical 
blind spots and illuminate one angle in the deep, mutual hostilities that 
permeate the country today.30  The discussion seeks in part to engage and 
make sense of the type of anti-government, anti-environmental populism 
that environmentalist sympathizers have at times dismissed.31 
Because of the polarizing nature of this topic and the 
unpopularity of people like the Bundys who support the transfer agenda, 
subtler, related problems stand to be overlooked or minimized.32  The 
potential for these problems to remain invisible is troubling partly 
because many western communities suffer from the widespread 
economic stagnation that characterizes the American rural landscape.33  
                                                 
27. E.g., David Uberti, A Divided Empire: What the Urban-Rural Split 
Means for the Future of America, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www. 
theguardian.com/cities/2017/jan/09/donald-trump-divided-empire-urban-rural-
america-future. 
28. Eisenberg, supra note 1. 
29. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Climate Policy in the Trump Era: Carbon 
Tax Rising? (February 27, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2926476 (discussing strong representation of climate deniers 
within Trump administration).   
30. Cf. Robert Reich, Tribalism Is Tearing America Apart, SALON 
(Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/03/25/robert_reich_tribalism_is_ 
tearing_america_apart_partner/. 
31. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 126, 134. 
32. Cf. Michelle Bryan, Learning Both Directions: How Better Federal-
Local Land Use Collaboration Can Quiet the Call for Federal Lands Transfers, 76 
MONT. L. REV. 147, 148 (2015) [hereinafter Bryan, Learning Both Directions] 
(noting that political posturing over western lands overshadows real problems). 
33. See JENNIFER SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, THOSE WHO DON’T: 
POVERTY, MORALITY, AND FAMILY IN RURAL AMERICA (2009); CYNTHIA M. 
DUNCAN, WORLDS APART: WHY POVERTY PERSISTS IN RURAL AMERICA (2000); Lisa 
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Although local opinions vary, many residents of these areas sympathize 
with the Sagebrush Rebel agenda.34  Residents may also see “rebellion” 
as the only option due to a lack of access to justice or some other form of 
voicelessness.35  This inquiry is thus based in part on the premise that 
when laypeople or underprivileged people express outrage about land 
use, they rarely do so with full eloquence or sophisticated legal 
advocacy.36  As Joseph Sax remarked, “[e]ven interests that don’t at all 
resemble ordinary property give rise to important values and 
expectations that cry for recognition, and sometimes get it.”37  Further, 
corporate and political actors’ ability to exploit populist concerns does 
not necessarily mean the populist concerns are baseless.38   
Finally, scholars have observed that the complex relationships 
between westerners and federal land managers involve principles that 
                                                                                                             
Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child 
Poverty and Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1 (2010); Jens Manuel Krogstad, How the 
Geography of U.S. Poverty Has Shifted Since 1960, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 10, 
2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/10/how-the-geography-of-u-s-
poverty-has-shifted-since-1960/. 
34. Babbit, supra note 7, at 853.  (“It is easy to dismiss the motives of 
the small group of stockmen and their political allies who have revived the rallying 
cry of states’ rights for their own benefit.  But the considerable support that the 
Sagebrush Rebellion has gained in the West reflects a deep-seated frustration with 
what is perceived to be heavy-handed, arbitrary, and unreasonable federal regulation 
of public lands.”). 
35. Cf. Robert L. Fischman & Jeremiah I. Williamson, The Story of 
Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion As Un-Cooperative Federalism, 
83 U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 129–30 (2011) (“[A]djudicated rights do not necessarily 
translate into social facts. . . . [A] strictly legal evaluation of the Kleppe litigation 
fails to measure its true significance as a galvanizing event for the Sagebrush 
Rebellion of the 1970s . . . . social science scholarship helps explain how . . . western 
states made lemonade out of courthouse losses.  The political consequences of the 
‘un-cooperative’ [federalism] challenges to federal power mostly aided ranchers and 
other interest groups associated with western state governments.”); Lisa Pruitt & 
Bradley Showman, Law Stretched Thin: Access to Justice in Rural America, 59 S. 
DAKOTA L. REV. 466 (2014) [hereinafter Pruitt & Showman, Access to Justice]. 
36. Cf. Sanders, supra note 12, at 2. (noting advantage some citizens 
may receive in deliberative processes because of greater ability to articulate 
arguments in rational, reasonable terms, and concomitant disadvantages borne by 
groups that are already underrepresented in formal political institutions).  
37. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its 
Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 187 (1980) [hereinafter Sax, 
Liberating the PTD]. 
38. Cf. Sanders, supra note 12, at 2. 
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transcend formal law.39  While transfer advocates’ constitutional claims 
invariably fail, scholars have remarked upon other concepts at play in 
this context, including “a de facto rebuttable presumption in favor of 
claim renewal,” the “rationale behind the doctrine” of adverse 
possession, and other forms of informal law, operative law, or law that 
appears to mold itself to fit with practice.40  This unique interplay of 
formal law and some form of shadow law—be it a natural law, cultural 
law, or an of-necessity set of practices—suggests the presence of a 
unique paradigm requiring further examination.  Although not the focus 
here, the theory of popular constitutionalism—the idea that people 
assume “active and ongoing control over the interpretation and 
enforcement of constitutional law”—would also suggest this deeper look 
is warranted.41 
The Article concludes that a more substantial basis in ethical and 
legal principle than is generally recognized supports the idea that 
communities near public lands experience injustices, and that 
communities may be entitled to some form of input over land use.  
Although little formal law supports this stance,42 these principled, 
affirmative findings are significant for western public lands management.  
The findings suggest to federal agencies and other land use managers 
that their duties extend beyond an altruistic or self-serving interest in 
incorporating local concerns into public lands management.  Rather, this 
more nuanced foundation suggests that public land managers have an 
actual normative obligation to pursue devolved collaboration.  At the 
very least, the findings suggest that some westerners’ outrage over land 
use should not automatically be dismissed as irrational.  This latter point 
in turn relates to natural resources policy as well as the broader societal 
divide, suggesting that the discourse is sometimes overly dismissive of 
the concerns of the “other side” when a legitimate grievance is 
expressed.43 
Part I.A provides an overview of “complaints” raised by transfer 
advocates, using the Sagebrush Rebellion and the Bundy family as a 
proxy for the broader movement and illustration of some of the 
                                                 
39. See Bruce Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public 
Property, 102 GEO. L. J. 991, 1038 (2014). 
40. Id.; Klass, supra note 26. 
41. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959, 
959 (2004). 
42. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1701(a)(8) 
(2012); 16 U.S.C § 1604(b) (2012); FWS Refuge Planning Overview, supra note 14; 
NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 14, at 2.2.  
43. See Reich, supra note 30.  
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movement’s community-based rhetoric.  This section also reviews main 
policy points relevant to western public lands management.  Part I.B 
briefly dispenses with the explicit legal arguments that transfer advocates 
tend to make.  After introducing the lens of the “pro se analysis” and 
defining “local community,”44 Part II concludes that transfer advocates’ 
community-based rhetoric and related complaints over western land 
management give rise to several “colorable claims.”  Specifically, it 
assesses the contours and merits of three ethically and legally principled 
theories that I use to characterize the strongest arguments for justifying 
local outrage, including: (1) an Exclusion Theory based on procedural 
justice, the right to participatory land use decisionmaking, due process, 
and what I call “reverse environmental justice”; (2) a Reliance Theory 
that combines aspects of estoppel, adverse possession, and the concept of 
“just transitions”; and (3) a Public Trust Doctrine Theory.  Part III 
discusses collaboration as a remedy to address these concerns.  While 
this discussion necessarily simplifies a complex and far-reaching system 
that is not conducive to any one-size-fits-all characterization, the hope is 
to “enrich the storehouse of ideas we draw from in the search for 
solutions,”45 as well as to shed light on a controversy that serves as an apt 
symbol for larger divisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44. Cf. Sax, Do Communities Have Rights?, supra note 17, at 499–500 
(“Although there is no definition of community, nor a doctrine of community 
entitlements to bring legal coherences to . . . diverse cases . . . the law has by no 
means been indifferent to particular claims in a range of specific situations. . . . 
[T]here is a widespread sense that community is important, and a willingness exists 
to protect community interests; yet there is no principle or doctrine to which to turn 
in those cases where, for whatever reasons, the people affected are unable to 
generate the political support necessary to induce an act of grace.”).  Although “local 
community” is defined here geographically, the discussion recognizes that both 
tension and overlap likely exist among pluralistic, geographically defined 
communities, and the more identity- or occupation-based communities that may hold 
the loyalties of people like the Sagebrush Rebels.  See Sarah F. Bates, Public Lands 
Communities: In Search of a Community of Values, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 81 
(1993).  
45. Babcock, Dual Regulation, supra note 8, at 196.  
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II.  THE LAND TRANSFER MOVEMENT AND THE SAGEBRUSH 
REBELLION: BACKGROUND AND MERITLESS LEGAL 
ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Factual and Policy Background 
 
The emergence of the Sagebrush Rebellion represented the first 
phase in the evolution of the Land Transfer Movement (“LTM”).46  The 
Rebellion has been active since the 1970s, after conservation laws, such 
as the FLPMA, foreclosed future private appropriations of public land 
and began to infringe upon western commodity producers’ activities.47  
Since then, the Rebellion and related groups, such as Wise Use and 
County Supremacy, have surged under Democratic administrations and 
waned under Republican ones.48  The tactics of these groups, which 
comprise the LTM’s militant arm, have consistently involved standoffs 
and the use of force.49  For instance, the “Bundy” of the 1990s was 
Richard Carver, a Nevada rancher featured on the cover of Time 
magazine after he “bulldozed open a road on Forest Service land that had 
                                                 
46. Richard Lee Simmons, The Sale of Our Land: A Look at Public 
Land Transfers, 5 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1068, 1070 (2015). 
47. Keiter, supra note 9, at 1129, 1176 (discussing, in addition to 
FPLMA, “the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, [and] the National Forest Management Act of 1976”); Leshy, supra 
note 20, at 341, 341–43 (“[T]he Public Land Law Review Commission . . . . 
concluded that most public lands would not serve the maximum public interest in 
private ownership. . . . As the reality of [new] restrictions has become apparent, 
those most affected—graziers and miners—have begun to chafe at this reduction in 
their freedom of exploitation.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Swearingen & 
Schimel, supra note 3; Babbitt, supra note 7, at 854; see also Fischman & 
Williamson, supra note 35 (pointing to Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act 
of 1971 as displacing ranching as de facto priority use of public range, helping 
trigger Sagebrush Rebellion). 
48. Knickerbocker, supra note 21; McCarthy, supra note 21, at 1282–
83 (“[Wise Use] claimed to be a grass roots social movement, rooted in a regional 
culture, responding to overly intrusive outsiders.  It defined itself mainly in 
opposition to the environmental movement, environmental regulations, and federal 
agencies governing land uses, all of which it portrayed as arrogant, ignorant 
outsiders intruding on local communities and denying them their livelihoods and 
right to self-determination.”); Robin Bravender, Bundys Fuel ‘Round Two’ of 
Sagebrush Rebellion, GREENWIRE (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/ 
1060030207 (noting that tensions associated with Sagebrush Rebellion “died down a 
bit” under President Reagan, and flared up under President Clinton and President 
Obama). 
49. Bravender, supra note 48.  
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been closed” with “a crowd of friends and neighbors cheering him on as 
federal officials stood by.”50   
The LTM transcends well beyond angry ranchers or other self-
styled cowboys, however, and the political arm of the movement has 
achieved substantial clout.51  For instance, western state legislators have 
regularly introduced bills seeking to effectuate title transfers of public 
lands, prompting former Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the Interior 
John Leshy to characterize them as entirely “rebellious states.”52  In 
2014, the Republican National Committee made the transfer of public 
lands to the states part of its national platform.53 
The LTM’s goals are not necessarily always articulated in a 
consistent manner.  However, the main goal always has the same thrust: 
secure more local or private access to public lands.  Some transfer 
advocates pursue the goal by claiming that individual commodity 
producers have property rights-entitlements to particular lands or 
resources.54  Others argue that the states have formal legal rights to the 
land.55  Yet others argue in favor of county control.56  The Posse 
Comitatus and County Home Rule/County Supremacy movements, for 
instance, went so far as refusing to recognize any government authority 
beyond the county sheriff.57  This discussion treats these movements’ 
                                                 
50. Knickerbocker, supra note 21; see also Robert L. Glicksman, Fear 
and Loathing on the Federal Lands, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 647 (1997). 
51. Howell Raines, Reagan and States’ Rights; News Analysis, N. Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 4, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/04/us/reagan-and-states-
rights-news-analysis.html?pagewanted=all. 
52. Leshy, supra note 20, at 327. 
53. Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 1. 
54. Sally Fairfax, Old Recipes for New Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 945, 
986–69 (1982); Sagebrush Rebellion, PBS (May 13, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/ 
wnet/religionandethics/2016/05/13/sagebrush-rebellion/30487/ (discussing the goal 
of the Rebellion to give public land to local governments).  
55. Leshy, supra note 20, at 326. 
56. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 22; Alexander H. Southwell, The County 
Supremacy Movement: The Federalism Implications of a 1990s States' Rights Battle, 
32 GONZ. L. REV. 417 (1997); Reed, supra note 2. 
57. See Swearingen & Schimel, supra note 3 (“For purposes of this 
discussion, these movements are treated as distinct from similar ones that do not 
focus on natural resources, and focus primarily on the illegitimacy of the federal 
government.”); see Daniel Lessard Levin & Michael W. Mitchell, A Law Unto 
Themselves: The Ideology of the Common Law Court Movement, 44 S.D. L. REV. 9 
(1999) (discussing common law court movement, groups such as Montana Freemen 
and Republic of Texas, and personal sovereignty movements and how they “misuse 
principles from liberal theory, English common law, and the American constitutional 
tradition to support their claims”). 
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efforts as collectively represented in the Sagebrush Rebellion and 
focuses on the militant and populist arm of the LTM, rather than the 
political arm.  
The Rebellion received relatively little mainstream attention 
during the Obama administration until members of the Bundy family 
became involved in tense standoffs with federal officials over contested 
public land uses.58  Carol Rose describes patriarch Cliven’s 2014 
incident:  
 
In the spring of 2014, rancher Cliven Bundy, together 
with a group of self-appointed armed “militiamen,” 
placed himself in a standoff with the Federal Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) in southern Nevada.  The 
BLM insisted that Bundy owed over $1 million in 
delinquent and current fees for grazing his livestock on 
federally owned land, but Bundy insisted that grazing on 
this land should be costless to him and refused to pay.  
Bundy’s group effectively chased off the federal officials 
and, in doing so, garnered considerable conservative 
media support—at least until Bundy himself made some 
extemporaneous and intemperate remarks about the 
state’s African-American population.  Not surprisingly, 
his reference to alleged welfare freeloading invited 
comparison to his own considerable outstanding bill for 
the use of federal property.59 
 
The Bundy family once again drew national attention when adult 
sons Ammon and Ryan led a militant takeover of the Malheur Wildlife 
Refuge in Harney County, Oregon, in January and February 2016.60  
What began as a peaceful protest of the incarceration of two local 
ranchers evolved into Ammon and Ryan leading a splinter group that 
                                                 
58. Bravender, supra note 48; see also Martin Nie & Christopher Barns, 
The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Wilderness Act: The Next Chapter in Wilderness 
Designation, Politics, and Management, 5 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 237, 273–74 
(2014) (arguing that western states’ bills and resolutions seeking to transfer federal 
lands to states “breathed life into a once dormant Sagebrush Rebellion”). 
59. Carol M. Rose, Claiming While Complaining on the Federal Public 
Lands: A Problem for Public Property or a Special Case? A Comment on Bruce R. 
Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 104 GEO. L.J. 
ONLINE 95, 111 (2015); see Huber, supra note 39.  
60. Nora Simon, Oregon Standoff: A Timeline of How the 
Confrontation Unfolded, OREGON LIVE (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.oregonlive. 
com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/01/oregon_standoff_a_timeline_of.html.  
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forcefully occupied Refuge headquarters, insisting they would not leave 
“until local property owners ha[d] control over the refuge.”61  They 
purported to protest “federal tyranny,” encouraging local ranchers “to 
tear up their government grazing contracts.”62  The occupiers were 
arrested in late January and early February.63  In October 2016, the 
Bundy brothers were “shockingly” acquitted of charges of conspiracy to 
impede federal officers.64  As of this writing, Cliven, Ammon, and Ryan 
Bundy are slated to be prosecuted for the 2014 Nevada standoff under 
sixteen felony charges.65 
Although Sagebrush Rebels’ tactics and goals garner 
condemnation, commentators have consistently recognized that political 
posturing, longstanding disputes, and dramatic scenarios have masked 
real governance problems—remarking, ultimately, on the unfairness 
concern. 66  Former Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbit wrote in 1982 that 
though Sagebrush Rebels’ motives were “suspect,” these conflicts 
illustrated intergovernmental tensions concerning how to manage 
voluminous western federal land holdings.67  Pointing to federal lands’ 
impediment on localities’ ability to plan, zone, and allocate water, Babbit 
                                                 
61. Id.  
62. Id.; Hal Bernton, The Story Behind the Malheur National Wildlife 
Refuge, Ranchers and Armed Anti-Government Protestors, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 9, 
2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/occupied-oregon-wildlife-
refuge-known-for-listening-to-ranchers/; Liam Stack, Wildlife Refuge Occupied in 
Protest of Oregon Ranchers’ Prison Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/us/oregon-ranchers-will-return-to-prison-
angering-far-right-activists.html; Faces of the Malheur Occupation: Meet the 
Militants and Their Visitors, OREGON LIVE (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.oregonlive. 
com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/01/oregon_militant_profiles_list.html.  
63. Stack, supra note 62; Kirk Seigler, Bundy Militia Not Backing 
Down Following Oregon Trial Acquittal, NPR (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.npr.org/ 
2016/11/04/500506710/bundy-militia-not-backing-down-following-oregon-trial-
acquittal. 
64. Seigler, supra note 63. 
65. Ken Ritter, Prosecutors Want 3 Bunkerville Trials; Cliven Bundy 
Wants 1, OREGON PUBLIC BROADCASTING (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.opb.org/ 
news/article/cliven-bundy-trials-how-many-bunkerville/. 
66. Bravender, supra note 48; Knickerbocker, supra note 21; Ray Ring 
& Marshall Swearingen, Defuse the West: Public-Land Employees Are Easy Targets 
for a Violent, Government-Hating Fringe, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (CA) (Oct. 27, 
2014), http://www.hcn.org/issues/46.18/defuse-the-west; Klass, supra note 26, at 41; 
Elizabeth G. Daerr, Study Finds Park Rangers Facing Increased Violence: Fugitives 
Are Drawn to Isolation of Parks, Putting Rangers at Risk, 75 NAT’L PARKS, Nov. 
2001, at 12–13, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Study finds park rangers 
facing increased violence: fugitives are...-a080015214; Babbit, supra note 7, at 848. 
67. Babbit, supra note 7, at 848. 
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concluded that “[b]y any conceivable measure of the relative federal and 
state interest, management of the public domain in the West is not fairly 
shared.”68  Babbit argued that the unfairness lay not in locals’ lack of 
ownership, but in a lack of management control by local constituencies, 
and thus called for strengthening mechanisms for joint decisionmaking.69  
In 2015, University of Montana law professor Michelle Bryan 
raised similar arguments: “While there is ample political rhetoric to go 
around, beneath it all lie truly important questions about current land 
management practices and the complementary roles federal agencies and 
local communities could play in managing shared lands.”70  In a series of 
interviews with local government and federal agency representatives, 
Bryan found that both camps noted a lack of or dissatisfaction with 
processes of local-federal collaboration.71  An illustrative problem was 
federal agencies’ tendency to file county concerns as among the 
“nonsignificant” issues in their Environmental Assessments created 
pursuant to NEPA.72  For instance, in a case study of one wildlife 
refuge’s comprehensive conservation planning process, county officials 
raised concerns about “cabin leases, private mineral rights, grazing fees, 
road access, federal water rights, and military overflights.”73  However, 
after agency planners deemed the concerns “nonsignificant,” one county 
commissioner lamented “hours and hours” of wasted efforts trying to 
contribute and ultimately “feeling like it was a waste of time because 
nobody was listening to us anyway.”74  Although “nonsignificant” has a 
technical meaning for agencies, for local laypeople, it may seem 
dismissive and alienating.75 
The county commissioner’s comments reveal the diversity of 
local sentiments concerning federal ownership of public land.  Many 
western residents value the public lands as they are and are content with 
the status quo, or wish to see changes unrelated to the Sagebrush Rebel 
agenda.76  However, regional sympathies for more robust local 
                                                 
68. Id. at 853. 
69. Id. at 853, 858. 
70. Bryan, Learning Both Directions, supra note 32. 
71. Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 1. 
72. Id. at 14. 
73. Bryan, Learning Both Directions, supra note 32, at 151. 
74. Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 20. 
75. Id. at 14 (“[A]gency planning jargon can be off-putting and difficult 
to understand.”). 
76. See, e.g., Eva Hershaw, People in the Western U.S. Really Do Want 
Federal Regulation of Land, VICE NEWS (Jan. 12, 2016), https://news.vice.com/ 
article/people-in-the-western-us-really-do-want-federal-regulation-of-land. 
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empowerment run deep.77  For instance, a small public opinion poll 
conducted in 2014 in eight western mountain states found that a majority 
of Utah residents (52%) and a plurality of Wyoming residents 
(percentage unknown) favored a transfer of public lands to the states.78 
Some refinements to mitigate these conflicts have been made in 
the more than thirty years between Babbit’s and Bryan’s observations.79  
NEPA regulations, the common denominator among all agency planning 
frameworks, give agencies permission to designate local governments as 
“cooperating agencies” for planning purposes, which in turn can lead to 
close cooperation on planning.80  Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) 
regulations require collaboration in the creation of resource management 
plans, in addition to any NEPA collaboration pursued.81  The Negotiated 
Rulemaking Act of 1996 and the Department of Interior Adaptive 
Management Technical Guide also purport to further local-federal 
collaboration by facilitating stakeholder input and decisionmaking.82  
Technological innovations and various recent “open government” 
initiatives may help facilitate increased public participation, although 
these avenues remain untested.83 
Obstacles are significant and persistent, however.  Although the 
“legal and policy framework indicates high-level support for the 
principles of public engagement governance . . . [it] is not yet widely 
adopted by managers in day to day practice.”84  Compared to BLM, Fish 
and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and National Park Service (“NPS”) have 
more inconsistent directives and cultures in their approaches to 
                                                 
77. Eisenberg, supra note 1; Bryan, Learning Both Directions, supra 
note 32, at 151. 
78. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 124–25 (describing Wyoming as 
“divided”); Memorandum from Lori Weigel, Partner, Pub. Opinion Strategies & 
David Metz, Partner, Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz & Assocs., to Interested 
Parties, Western Voter Attitudes Toward Management of Public Lands 2 (Sept. 23, 
2014), available at https://perma.cc/6X37-WXRZ.  
79. E.g., Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 3 (noting 
“limited examples of emerging collaboration”). 
80. Id. at 5. 
81. Id. at 8. 
82. Kirsten M. Leong et al., The New Governance Era: Implications for 
Collaborative Conservation and Adaptive Management in Department of the 
Interior Agencies, 16 HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF WILDLIFE, 2011, at 236, 239, available 
at https://www.nps.gov/civic/resources/Leong%20et%20al_2011_New%20Gover 
nance %20Era.pdf. 
83. Cf. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative 
Law: Building the Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 297, 348–49 (2010). 
84. Leong, supra note 82, at 239. 
EISENBERG PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/24/2017 7:58 PM 
 
  
74 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 38 
 
 
collaborating with localities.85  As to NEPA, overall, “agency planners 
vary in their understanding of NEPA and agency planning protocols and 
hold a multitude of views about whether and how to include local 
governments.”86  NEPA has been criticized as perfunctory and “lacking 
the soul” needed for what is necessarily an intimate and involved 
process.87  The variability among agency processes and cultures confuses 
and estranges some residents.88   Bryan’s interviews revealed that many 
agency planners “believe more is needed to foster true local-federal 
collaboration and build long-term relationships.”89 
 
B. Dispensing with Transfer Advocates’ and Sagebrush Rebels’ Legal 
Arguments 
 
Transfer advocates’ arguments go well beyond the unfairness 
concern and nuanced discussions about process.  Yet, discerning the 
precise parameters of their legal claims to public lands is not always an 
easy task.  Movements of the 1970s and 1980s may have had a more 
cohesive approach, but the specific claims raised today appear to differ 
from incident to incident and place to place.90  For instance, a journalist 
who spent time at Malheur during Bundy’s occupation commented that it 
did him “no good whatsoever” to try and discuss the provisions and 
operations of actual law and government with the occupiers.91  He 
observed that any time an argument arose that could not be easily 
countered, he was “assailed with a pocket Constitution,” and little 
more.92  “Liberty and freedom and the Constitution” were similarly cited 
in general terms in Cliven Bundy’s 2014 standoff with federal officials.93   
One argument transfer advocates have raised for decades, also 
asserted at Malheur, is that Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the 
Constitution, also known as the “Enclave Clause” within the 
enumerations of the federal government’s powers,94 established “that the 
                                                 
85. See Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 10–12. 
86. Id. at 13. 
87. Id. at 7, 14 (quoting Fish & Wildlife Service project leader). 
88. See id. at 6, 14. 
89. Id. at 7. 
90. Hal Herring, Can We Make Sense of the Malheur Mess?, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/malheur-occupation-
oregon-ammon-bundy-public-lands-essay.  
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1. 
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (“The Congress shall have power . . . 
[t]o exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not 
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federal government ha[d] no right to own any of these lands.”95  This 
argument has been consistently dismissed.  Article IV, Section III of the 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall have power to dispose of and 
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other 
property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution 
shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or 
of any particular state.”96  The United States Supreme Court has 
construed this latter provision liberally.  In the 1840 United States v. 
Gratiot97 decision, the Court held that the Article IV power is “vested in 
Congress without limitation.”98  A few decades later in Gibson v. 
Chouteau,99 the Court held that no limitations existed over the federal 
power to use and dispose of public lands.  In Kleppe v. New Mexico in 
1976,100 the Court reaffirmed that “the power over the public land thus 
entrusted to Congress is without limitations”101 and upheld the Wild and 
Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971,102 “a federal statute that 
pre-empted long-established state wildlife programs.”103  In short, the 
federal government’s Article IV authority over public lands is beyond 
question; as John Leshy has explained, “[t]here are 225 years of history 
and thousands and thousands of court decisions and congressional 
statutes that interpret the Constitution” in a manner contrary to these 
claims.104  
Other Malheur occupiers argued that “grazing rights on public 
land are a property right attached to the base private land.”105  This 
argument also fails.  The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 explicitly states 
that “the issuance of a grazing permit shall not create any right, title, 
                                                                                                             
exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the 
acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and 
to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature 
of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, 
dockyards, and other needful buildings.”); Spencer Driscoll, Utah’s Enabling Act 
and Congress’s Enclave Clause Authority: Federalism Implications of a Renewed 
State Sovereignty Movement, 2012 BYU L. REV. 999 (2012). 
95. Herring, supra note 90.  
96. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
97. 39 U.S. 526 (1840). 
98. Id. at 538. 
99. 80 U.S. 92 (1871). 
100. 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976). 
101. Id. at 539. 
102. 16 U.S.C. 30 (1971). 
103. Fairfax, supra note 54, at 970.  
104. Seigler, supra note 63.  
105. Herring, supra note 90. 
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interest, or estate in or to the [public] lands.”106  Although ranchers’ 
investments in their operations have been given some protections at 
times,107 in the 1973 case United States v. Fuller,108 the Supreme Court 
definitively concluded that “[t]he provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act . . 
. make clear the congressional intent that no compensable property right 
be created in the permit lands themselves as a result of the issuance of [a 
grazing] permit.”109 
Of course, if preexisting property rights based on longevity of 
use of western lands did exist, these claims would belong to Native 
Americans, including at Malheur.  “[R]ecords of human habitation in the 
Great Basin region date from approximately 12,000 B.C.”110  Several 
centuries ago, “ancestral relatives of modern native nations such as the 
Bannock, Chemehuevi, Kawaiisu, Mono, Paiute, Panamint, Shoshone, 
Goshute, Washoe, and Ute” arrived there, and their descendants still live 
there.111  During the Malheur occupation, representatives of the Paiute 
tribe claimed the occupiers were desecrating a sacred site and argued that 
“[t]he protestors have no claim to this land.  It belongs to the native 
people who continue to live here.”112  In contrast to the Malheur 
occupiers, Paiute leaders could at least point to an attempted 1868 treaty 
with the federal government that would have protected their land and 
cultural resources.113  Also unlike the occupiers, the federal government 
actually did impose a forced relocation on the Paiute tribe in 1879.114 
Transfer advocates have also pointed to Article IV, Section 3 of 
the Constitution providing for the admission of new states to the 
Union.115  “Particularly, the rebels construe the so-called ‘equal footing’ 
doctrine—which allows that all states are admitted to the Union on an 
                                                 
106. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2012). 
107. See, e.g., Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 
1938) (While the court recognized that rights under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 
did not fall within the conventional category of vested rights in property, it 
concluded that equity required recognition of the substance of the interest rather than 
the nomenclature, and the “real value for the possessors” was something to be 
recognized.). 
108. 409 U.S. 488 (1973). 
109. Id. at 494. 
110. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 10. 
111. Id. at 11. 
112. Carissa Wolf, Go Vegan and Go Home: Occupiers Under Siege 
from PETA, Native Tribe, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/01/06/go-vegan-and-go-home-
occupiers-under-siege-from-peta-native-tribe//. 
113. Id.  
114. Id.  
115. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3; Leshy, supra note 20, at 319. 
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equal footing with each other—to require that all states be treated alike 
as far as federal retention of lands within their borders after 
statehood.”116  However, states typically bargained away any claim they 
may have had to federal lands in exchange for entry into statehood in the 
first place.117  Leshy argues that if states were afforded a remedy based 
on this claim, they would have to give up their statehood.118 
Claims that counties have superior rights to the land also do not 
withstand scrutiny.  In the 1990s, several dozen counties in Nevada, 
California, Idaho, New Mexico, and Oregon passed ordinances 
purporting to require certain forms of federal consultation with localities 
in decisionmaking over public lands.119  Proponents of these “custom and 
culture ordinances” pointed to: (1) NEPA section 101, which directs the 
federal government to preserve “cultural aspects of our national 
heritage”; and (2) the FLPMA’s provisions for public participation and 
local-federal collaboration.120  Courts have held these and comparable 
ordinances seeking to regulate public lands unconstitutional based on 
federal preemption.121  
Although this section has not addressed all claims raised in 
western anti-federalist tensions over public lands, it shows that several of 
the most popular claims to public lands do not withstand even brief 
analysis.122  Federal ownership of western land is a longstanding practice 
with strong, longstanding authority; formal legal claims otherwise do not 
find constitutional support.  The discussion below explores concepts that 
transcend formal legal arguments, looking to discern whether other 
principles might justify the sense of injustice that many in the region 
feel. 
 
 
 
                                                 
116. Leshy, supra note 20, at 319–20. 
117. Id. at 326 (discussing, inter alia, Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500 
(1980), and suggesting that if states were given the remedy of title to public lands, 
they would have to give up their statehood). 
118. Id. 
119. Knickerbocker, supra note 21; Hungerford, supra note 2, at 457. 
120. Hungerford, supra note 2, at 469. 
121. Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary Cnty., 913 P.2d 1141, 1147 
(1996); United States v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of the Cty. of Otero, 184 F. Supp. 3d 
1097 (D.N.M. 2015), aff'd United States v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Otero, 
843 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2016); S.D. Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence Cnty., 155 F.3d 
1005 (8th Cir. 1998). 
122. Klass, supra note 26, at 41 (concluding that claims of adverse 
possession also fail, for instance).  
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III.  THE COLORABLE CLAIMS 
 
Having dismissed transfer advocates’ legal arguments and claims 
to outright ownership, and recognizing that other legal standards are of 
limited help to their case, this discussion searches for the strongest 
arguments they could advance based in more general principles.  As 
mentioned above, the analysis is inspired by courts’ treatment of pro se 
litigants’ complaints, where decisionmakers focus on the most relevant 
allegations, construe those allegations liberally, and aim to discern the 
strongest claims.123  The allegations of interest to the strongest claims in 
                                                 
123. Federal courts’ lenient treatment of pro se complaints goes back to 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Haines v. Kerner.  404 U.S. 519, 520 
(1972).  In Haines, the Court stated that it held a pro se complaint “to less stringent 
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”  Id.  Courts’ policies of 
leniency and even active assistance have since been extended to motions for 
summary judgment, appellate briefs, administrative proceedings, and other 
procedures.  Correll, supra note 25; Holt, supra note 25, at 171.  The rationales 
behind this “paternalistic approach” vis-à-vis complaints center on free, open, and 
equal access to the judicial system and the notion that decisionmakers in positions of 
power have heightened duties to vulnerable members of society.  Douglas A. Blaze, 
Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights 
Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 970–71 (1990); Correll, supra note 25, at 
881.  In Moran v. Astrue, in which the court reviewed a pro se social security matter 
on appeal from an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”):  
 
[t]he court explained that pro se litigants enjoy a special status in 
the Second Circuit.  In particular, the mere presence of 
a pro se litigant imposes ‘heightened’ duties on the ALJ.  The 
court even went so far as to explain that ‘[t]he ALJ must 
adequately protect a pro se claimant's rights by ensuring that all 
of the relevant facts are sufficiently developed and considered.’   
 
Correll, supra note 25, at 881. 
Later, “[i]n Weixel v. Board of Education of New York, the court held in the 
course of a normal civil litigation matter that ‘the [pro se litigants’] allegations in 
this case must be read so as to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest’”.  Id.  
These rationales in turn are based on pro se litigants’ due process right to a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard.  The standards for ensuring this opportunity 
typically maintain that, rather than acting as passive arbiters that disregard litigants’ 
circumstances, decisionmakers should take an active role to find pro se 
complainants’ strongest claims or to look for “any allegation stating federal relief.”  
Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Adam N. Steinman, The 
Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010).  Thus, while a court normally 
disregards claims that are “vague and conclusory,” Easter v. Hill, No. 95-3047, 1997 
WL 30553, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 1997) (“When a litigant . . . fails to support with 
fact his allegations of constitutional violations, the allegations are vague and 
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this analysis are (1) something about federal-local relations is unjust to 
local communities; and (2) western communities proximal to public 
lands are somehow entitled to more access and control. 
This intellectual exercise is premised on the possibility that those 
crying foul may face disadvantages in the public discourse that are 
analogous to being unrepresented in court.124  Those disadvantages could 
include poverty, disenfranchisement, limited access to justice, and the 
inartfulness or inaccuracy that laypeople may exhibit when seeking to 
articulate injustices.  They could also include the possibility that high-
profile characters like the Bundys distract from real problems and inspire 
commentators to dismiss concerns.  Another possible disadvantage is that 
the urgency of climate change may inspire minimization of unfair 
governance.  In light of these issues, this discussion recognizes a need to 
give some of the disgruntled an opportunity to be heard in discourse and 
scholarship.  I refer to these advocates for community empowerment—
which include Sagebrush Rebels, other LTM proponents, and others 
unassociated with those movements—as “the complainers,” as they are 
the theoretical complainants in this analysis.125 
This framing is not intended to suggest that the complainers are 
invariably voiceless or lacking other means to pursue their political aims.  
Indeed, as Alexandra Klass has observed, those who currently use public 
lands for commodity production: 
 
receive the benefits of grazing, resource extraction, or 
other land uses at low cost without any of the burdens of 
land ownership.  . . . [They] do not pay taxes on the land, 
                                                                                                             
conclusory, and the claims must be dismissed.”), it relaxes that standard where 
litigants are at certain disadvantages.    
124. Cf. Pruitt & Showman, Access to Justice, supra note 35. 
125. Admittedly, this group is defined somewhat loosely for purposes of 
this discussion.  Whoever does and does not comprise the “complainers” may in fact 
be determinative of what constitutes an injustice in this context.  Indeed, the prospect 
of untangling real regional problems from political posturing is one of the challenges 
in trying to deal with the Sagebrush Rebellion.  This discussion seeks merely to 
contemplate that while it is easy to condemn people like the Bundys, there are other, 
more sympathetic, or even tragic figures who share their sympathies and may not 
warrant such quick condemnation—the frustrated local government representative, 
for instance, see infra section 1A, or even individuals like Shawna Cox, who 
occupied Malheur and sued the U.S. government for “works of the devil.”  Justin 
Worland, Oregon Occupier Sues Government for $666 Billion over ‘Works of the 
Devil,’ TIME (Feb. 18, 2016), http://time.com/4229281/oregon-occuper-lawsuit/.  
This discussion contemplates that characters such as these may deserve more 
consideration as possible symbols of larger regional angst and desperation. 
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need not restore the land in case of drought or natural 
disaster, often have priority rates . . . and may face less 
liability for the environmental impacts of their activities 
than if they were the fee simple owners.126   
 
Many localities benefit from government jobs or contracts and see ample 
popular support for federal land ownership.127  This is also not the first 
time that the complainers have received consideration; others writing on 
this subject have entertained the arguments raised.128 
This exercise is worthwhile, first, because most inquirers do not 
take the extra analytical step to account for the complainers’ 
“disadvantages” presupposed here.  Yet, geography scholar James 
McCarthy has questioned why “Third World” movements based on 
cultural identity, local knowledge, self-determination, and access to 
resources garner western scholars’ sympathy, while in the First World 
context, they garner visceral condemnation.129   
Second, much of the inquiry on this subject stops at the edge of 
formal law.  Yet, several points of note suggest that a deeper look into 
informal norms is warranted.130  Joseph Sax and other property law 
scholars have observed of the unique nature of property that property 
attachments are fundamental, yet formal law and title often fail to 
adequately characterize them.131  Sax also commented that he sensed that 
                                                 
126. Klass, supra note 26, at 42. 
127. Patrik Jonsson, Armed Oregon Occupation: Is it Really About White 
Poverty in the West?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jan. 9, 2016), http:// 
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0109/Armed-Oregon-occupation-Is-it-
really-about-white-poverty-in-the-West (“Nine out of 10 Westerners surveyed in 
2013 by Colorado College said national parks and wildlife preserves are boons to the 
economy. . . . Moreover, federal subsidies and government jobs help keep many 
towns afloat, and low grazing fees have helped make many ranchers wealthy.”). 
128. E.g., Jonathan Thompson, The First Sagebrush Rebellion: What 
Sparked It and How It Ended (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/a-look-
back-at-the-first-sagebrush-rebellion. 
129. McCarthy, supra note 21.  
130. Jonsson, supra note 127 (discussing Western rural poverty, 
including Harney Country’s transition “from Oregon’s wealthiest to its poorest since 
federal land management tightened in the 1970s, and popular support for the 
Bundys’ message, though acknowledging the Bundys as “imperfect messengers”); 
Klass, supra note 26, at 47–48 (acknowledging that members of public may support 
the Bundys specifically and private claims to public lands generally).  
131. Sax, Liberating the PTD, supra note 37, at 187 (“The idea of justice 
at the root of private property protections calls for identification of those 
expectations which the legal ought to recognize . . . [and though] it is hard to 
imagine legally enforceable expectations unconnected to formal title . . . we know 
EISENBERG PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/24/2017 7:58 PM 
 
 
2017 DO SAGEBRUSH REBELS HAVE A COLORABLE CLAIM? 81 
 
 
tensions in competing claims of the local versus the state versus the 
national over land uses were:  
 
not likely to be fruitfully resolved by the means that 
have traditionally been applied to them—the effort to 
carve out separate domains of authority along political 
subdivision lines, and using doctrines such as commerce 
clause analysis and preemption.  Such traditional 
analysis fails to recognize the extent to which the nation, 
as the dominant community, has triumphed, and fails to 
accept that what local community values need most is to 
obtain recognition within (rather than as competitors of) 
national values.132 
 
Other considerations include the rift between the law as written 
and the law as practiced in this unique context;133 the surprising level of 
public sympathy with the Sagebrush Rebel agenda and historical lack of 
agency consideration of effects of agency actions on communities;134 and 
the fact that many commentators do not share the burdens of the 
conservation-oriented measures they call for.135 
The analysis conceptualizes a “public lands community” as a 
geographical entity, potentially bounded by municipal or county lines, 
located close enough to federal lands so as to be affected by agency 
decisionmaking.136  This definition necessitates, then, that white, anti-
government ranchers like the Bundys are not, in fact, adequate 
spokespeople for the concerns of these communities.  These communities 
include people of a variety of cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds 
and who have varied opinions about the state of public lands.137  
                                                                                                             
that, insofar as expectations underlie strong and deeply held legal-ethical ideals, they 
are not limited to title ownership.”). 
132. Sax, Do Communities Have Rights?, supra note 17, at 502. 
133. Cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Huber, 
supra note 39, at 1003–19. 
134. Sax, Do Communities Have Rights?, supra note 17, at 506 ([T]he 
law “does not agonize over” the effects of agency actions on aggregate communities, 
viewing those interests as “only sentiment.”). 
135. E.g., Froma Harrop, Federal Lands Belong to All of Us, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS (June 12, 2015), http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/ 
commentary/article/Federal-lands-belong-to-all-of-us-6324856.php (opinion piece 
written by journalist living in Providence, RI and New York, NY). 
136. Bates, supra note 44.  
137. Cf. id. at 83 (describing “the community of the Deschutes River 
basin in Oregon, which includes people living in the growing city of Bend, the small 
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Nonetheless, although the Sagebrush Rebellion and federal lands 
communities are not synonymous, substantial overlap between the 
complaints and demands of Sagebrush Rebels and the complaints and 
demands of many regional local (and state) governments suggests that to 
explore the one necessitates exploring the other.  In addition, both 
tension and overlap exist between the geographical communities 
surrounding public lands and the ideological or occupation-based 
communities of which Sagebrush Rebels see themselves as a part.138  
This discussion contemplates that both these communities—the diverse, 
geographically defined proximal communities and the ideological 
communities directly linked with “rebellion”—cannot always necessarily 
be distinguished, yet both must somehow be accounted for through law 
and governance. 
The discussion below expands upon three “colorable claims” of 
injustice that could be discerned from the complaints raised by those 
dissatisfied with federal lands management.  These three claims are 
discussed in terms of theories crafted here to encapsulate several 
different principles.  They include: (1) an Exclusion Theory based on 
procedural justice and the right to participatory land use decisionmaking, 
also touching on concepts of due process and a “reverse environmental 
justice” conceptualization; (2) a Reliance Theory based on conceptions 
of estoppel, adverse possession, and “just transitions”; and (3) a Public 
Trust Doctrine Theory.  
 
A. Exclusion Theory 
 
The first “colorable claim” that communities proximal to public 
lands could raise is a claim of exclusion: exclusion from environmental 
decisionmaking processes, exclusion from the regulatory system as a 
whole, and exclusion from the opportunity to collectively pursue 
distributive justice.  The exclusion, complainers would argue, stems from 
non-inclusive processes and inconsistencies within the regulatory 
scheme, as well as limited consideration of local interests in an oversight 
framework that has flavors of due process- or takings-like concerns.  
                                                                                                             
town of Maupin, the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, and all the other human 
settlements and outlying areas within the basin”). 
138. Cf. id. at 83–84 (arguing that “the geographic definition of 
community is simply inadequate to describe the complex relationships among the 
many individuals who share interests in the natural resources that occur on public 
lands,” and that identity-based communities, occupational communities, 
communities of interests, and institutions of governance are necessary frameworks to 
consider). 
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While this claim lacks the concreteness and weight of a formal legal 
claim—and while there are ample counterarguments rooted in formal 
law, the Supremacy Clause, and reasons for not making broad concerns 
like “exclusion” actionable—these considerations could at least be 
acknowledged as meaningful. 
This claim is perhaps best exemplified by the spate of custom 
and culture ordinances passed in the 1990s.139  These ordinances 
illustrate how many communities consider themselves to be external to 
or in adversarial relations with the federal agency governance paradigm.  
While counties could do much on their end to improve local-federal 
relations, this widespread sense of exclusion could reflect a weakness on 
the federal side.140 
In his 2014 article The Durability of Private Claims to Public 
Property, Bruce Huber explores the paradoxical governance regime that 
has characterized western public lands management for the past several 
decades.141  Most relevant to the discussion here is that the “open-access 
model” that dominated land management for the bulk of western history 
has never been truly overhauled even though more stringent conservation 
laws were imposed starting in the 1970s.142  Huber calls this latter regime 
the “proprietary model . . . in which the public interest in federal land is 
given effect not by offering open access, but by securing fair 
compensation for public resources extracted by private enterprise.”143  
The limp progress in the transition from open access to proprietary stems 
in large part from a shadow system of operative law that functions 
alongside and often in contrast to formal law on western public lands.144 
The regime’s failure to transition involves a parallel failure of 
meaningful transition in the treatment of private claims to public land: 
those claims that should be excluded or limited according to the 
proprietary model are instead sanctioned under the de facto open-access 
model.145  Under this dualistic legal framework, “even weak or limited 
entitlements” and “even claims that lack the formal status of property” 
seem to “take on a life of their own” and are “treated more or less as if 
they were protectable property interests, even when they are not so in the 
formal nomenclature of the law.”146   
                                                 
139. See Hungerford, supra note 2. 
140. Cf. Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 14–16. 
141. Huber, supra note 39, at 997. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 994. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 994, 1001. 
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The formal legal system also seems to operate in contradiction to 
its own directives, with the result of stymieing the transition to the 
proprietary model.  Although the federal government has legal authority 
to terminate, limit, or let expire many claims—mineral and ski resort 
leases, grazing permits, hydropower licenses, and residential leases, for 
instance—it nonetheless opts to do so less frequently than would be 
expected according to policy mandates characterizing the post-1970s 
conservation era.147  Rather, these rights “are often extended, expanded, 
renewed, and protected by law and by agency managerial practices in 
ways that shape, and often trump, other policy objectives with respect to 
federal land.”148  Huber deems these formal and informal rights 
“surprisingly durable,”149 and attributes this durability to two main 
factors: (1) natural resource law’s historical solicitude to traditional 
extractive industries; and (2) the reticence of officials and land 
management agencies to overhaul existing land uses despite new 
mandates because they have “local, visible, and immediate reasons not to 
disrupt them.”150 
Turning to the Exclusion Theory, these observations suggest that 
federal agencies could be accused of two wrongs.  First, they send 
stakeholders conflicting messages.  Namely, they are mandated under 
express provisions of law to take certain actions or serve certain policy 
objectives.  Yet, in many instances they either decline to do so or act 
with enough deference and leniency as to undermine their own 
mandates.151  Second, in these mixed messages sent to current or would-
be users, agencies fail to explicitly acknowledge and validate the thrust 
of historical patterns of use in order to prepare the regulated community 
for the fact that transitions are underway.  Rather, agencies defer to 
historical patterns through the mixed formal/informal legal system of 
lenience, non-enforcement, and grandfathering.  This latter deference 
might seem as if the system is doing those users a favor.  However, it 
could also leave them in an anxiety-inducing state of limbo. 
                                                 
147. Id. at 1001–02. 
148. Id. at 994–95. 
149. Id. at 994. 
150. Id. at 998.   
151. Id. at 1012–18.  Huber describes several examples of these 
practices.  For instance, the U.S. Forest Service has tolerated unauthorized cabins in 
National Forests, allowed unauthorized improvements to those cabins, and 
disregarded other violations, such as nonpayment of use fees and neglected 
maintenance.  Id.  As another example, he observes that “federal oil and gas leasing 
terms provide opportunities for private claimants to extend rights to public resources 
beyond what would generally be available on private lands, or even what would 
appear to be allowable on the face of federal law.”  Id. 
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These mixed messages could be chalked up to a common truth: 
law as practiced is never quite the same as law as written.152  The 
complexities of western land use may require de facto law to diverge 
even more than usual from written law.153  However, to the extent a 
pattern could be demonstrated, the mixed messages could also be 
characterized as a cardinal sin of government: arbitrariness.  
Arbitrariness has been defined as law enforced irrationally or “without 
adequate determining principle.”154  Courts, scholars, and other 
authorities have recognized for hundreds of years that arbitrariness is 
inimical to principled governance.155 Bryan has observed that 
communities proximal to public lands experience federal planning as 
arbitrary because it is “so highly discretionary that it has become 
inexcusably inconsistent from one agency to the next.”156  Interestingly, 
arbitrariness has also been defined in the very words used by Sagebrush 
Rebels—as “tyrannical, despotic, oppressive or by caprice.”157 
Arbitrariness that alienates the regulated community from the 
regulatory system is at the heart of procedural justice literature.  
Decisionmaking and governance procedures that people perceive to be 
fair nurture people’s trust in those systems, even if outcomes do not 
favor them.158  The reverse is true as well: the public’s propensity to 
comply with law is “powerfully influenced by people’s subjective 
judgments about the fairness of the procedures” through which 
                                                 
152. Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 133; Huber, supra note 39 (discussing 
management difficulties because of vast federal land holdings in west); Lisa Pruitt, 
The Rural Lawscape: Space Tames Law Tames Space, in THE EXPANDING SPACES 
OF LAW: A TIMELY LEGAL GEOGRAPHY (I. Braverman, N. Blomley, D. Delaney & A. 
Kedar, eds., 2013). 
153. Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 133; Huber, supra note 39 (discussing 
management difficulties because of vast federal land holdings in west). 
154. Christine N. Cimini, Principles of Non-Arbitrariness: Lawlessness 
in the Administration of Welfare, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 457 (2005). 
155. Id.  
156. Bryan, Learning Both Directions, supra note 32, at 149. 
157. Cimini, supra note 154; see generally PHILLIP PETTIT, 
REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 51–54 (1997) 
(discussing liberty as requiring security against interference on an arbitrary basis); 
PHILLIP PETTIT, JUST FREEDOM: A MORAL COMPASS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (2014) 
(discussing arbitrariness as “unfreedom”).  
158. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the 
Jurisprudence of Procedural Justice, 123 YALE L.J.  F. 525 (2014), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-sotomayor-and-the-jurisprudence-of-
procedural-justice (discussing relationships among fairness in decisionmaking, 
transparency, and perceptions of legitimacy and procedural justice in the legal 
system). 
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governmental entities exercise their authority.159  In turn, “[t]o be 
effective . . . laws need generally to be widely obeyed by members of the 
public in their everyday lives.”160  Procedural exclusion contributes to a 
vicious cycle of alienation and undermined legitimacy: exclusion fuels 
alienation among the regulated, alienation fuels non-compliance and 
outrage, and non-compliance and outrage further undermine institutions’ 
effectiveness. 
Protections against arbitrariness are also at the heart of due 
process and takings jurisprudence.  None of the complainers in this broad 
analysis would have a clear substantive due process, procedural due 
process, or takings claim—particularly given the lack of jurisprudential 
clarity in those doctrines.161  But if the question is whether land users’ 
sense of injustice is justified, it seems telling that themes relevant to 
those doctrines are all present here: (1) land, contracts, livelihoods, and 
other economic interests and activity; (2) unpredictable and inconsistent 
government regulation that may or may not impinge on those interests; 
(3) limitations on notice and the opportunity to be heard in relevant 
decisionmaking processes; and (4) limitations on compensation for 
losses.162    
A particularly sensitive and important process underscores the 
tensions at hand in federal land management and the case for procedural 
injustice in this context: land use decisionmaking.  Planners, 
philosophers, and environmental justice theorists agree that ethical norms 
and legal principles support the idea that people’s interest in participatory 
land use decisionmaking transcends formal law.163  For instance, in 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s articulation of the goals of “good 
political organization” as manifested through rights-like “capabilities,” 
she advocates not just freedom from pollution, but also the right to 
                                                 
159. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective 
Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 284 (2003). 
160. Id. 
161. Cf. John D. Echeverria, Public Takings of Private Contracts, 38 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 639 (2011). 
162. Id. 
163. The stance of the American Planning Association is that local land 
use planning “should be engaging citizens positively at all steps in the planning 
process, acknowledging and responding to their comments and concerns.  Through 
collaborative approaches, planning should build support for outcomes that ensure 
that what the public wants indeed will happen.” Patricia E. Salkin, Environmental 
Justice and Land Use Planning and Zoning, 32 REAL EST. L.J. 429, 436 (2003), 
available at http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1570 
&context=scholarlyworks. 
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“control over one’s environment.”164  While this latter point is not a call 
for unmitigated autonomous decisionmaking over land, it does sanction 
the combined, fundamental importance of property rights, economic 
opportunity, and the ability to participate in political processes.165 
A “reverse environmental justice” conceptualization is likewise 
relevant here.  Environmental justice is usually defined as the right to 
free and autonomous decisionmaking in order to ensure the fair 
distribution of the burdens and benefits of environmental conditions.166  
Classic environmental justice scenarios focus on marginalized 
communities that bear inordinate burdens of pollution.167  Yet, the 
rhetoric used to justify vast public land holdings in the West—that those 
lands “belong to all Americans”—evokes an analogous subjugation of 
local will to “the greater good.”  That is, for example, just as low-income 
communities may be coerced into bearing the hazards of a nearby factory 
while those living at a safe distance tout the economic benefits of the 
factory, those living nowhere near public lands nor experiencing the 
restrictions they entail may tout the conservation benefits of those 
restrictions.168  As Sax remarked (followed by several disclaimers about 
the primacy of pressing national priorities), “[w]e should be reluctant to 
                                                 
164. Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 273, 288 (1997). 
165. See id.; Nancy D. Perkins, Livability, Regional Equity, and 
Capability: Closing in on Sustainable Land Use, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 157 (2008). 
166. Raina Wagner, Adapting Environmental Justice: In the Age of 
Climate Change, Environmental Justice Demands a Combined Adaptation-
Mitigation Response, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 153, 158 (2011). 
167. Id. 
168. Jerrold Long, Public Lands, Common Ground, and the Smell of 
Sagebrush after the Rain, LPB NETWORK (Feb. 3, 2016), http://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/property/2016/02/public-lands-common-ground-and-the-smell-of-
sagebrush-after-the-rain.html (“A common response to sagebrush rebels is that the 
public lands are just that, public—owned by all people, whether in New York or 
Nevada, and managed by the federal government in trust for all of us.  In this 
argument, it doesn’t matter where a person lives, or whether they have or ever will 
visit the public lands—all should have equal say in their management.  That is, of 
course, true in a general sense.  But it assumes a specific type of and singular 
purpose for the public lands.  The public lands story is somewhat more complex than 
that . . . . [M]any current public lands users were part of that complex public lands 
history.  Long-term successful management of the public lands as public lands will 
require an intricate and nuanced understanding of the conflicting notions of purpose 
and ownership that have always been a part of the public lands story. . . . We cannot 
claim nor expect legitimacy if we ignore the history of the place or its people.”); see 
also Loka Ashwood & Kate MacTavish, Tyranny of the Majority and Rural 
Environmental Injustice, 47 J. RURAL STUD. 271 (2016) (noting under-discussion of 
rural environmental injustice). 
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require people to arrange their lives to serve the demands of some larger 
external community.”169  Although the environmental consequences in 
this context are conservation rather than pollution, this advocacy of 
inequitable distribution of a particular environmental pursuit seems 
violative of environmental justice principles.170  It at least evokes the 
need to consider the subjective nature of “benefits” versus “burdens” as 
they are experienced, and raises the question of whether the larger 
society is willing to admit that some inequity is involved in this model.   
The combined effects of the volume of western federal 
landholdings and the limitations on collaborative decisionmaking could 
thus be considered a “reverse environmental justice” scenario.  
Commentators acknowledge that the absence of avenues for local input 
may be unfair.  But the analysis above suggests that this regime and its 
dominating influence on local communities may be “unjust” according to 
certain specific paradigms.  The arbitrariness concern taken alone might 
suggest that the solution is more consistency and aggressive, top-down 
enforcement.  However, taken altogether, these considerations 
demonstrate how the absence of input into environmental 
decisionmaking is its own particularized ethically and/or legally 
principled failure.171 
 
B. Reliance Theory 
 
The second “colorable claim” that emerges from complainers’ 
community-based rhetoric is a claim centered on reliance.  The types of 
reliance complainers refer to in support of their claims of entitlements 
take on three forms.  First, they point to communities’ and individuals’ 
reliance on the longstanding history and continued persistence of the 
                                                 
169. Sax, Do Communities Have Rights?, supra note 17, at 509–10. 
170. Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between 
Environmental Laws and “Justice”, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 231–34 (1997) 
(discussing environmental justice as distributive justice and political justice—
respectively, justice of fairly distributed benefits and burdens, and justice of fairness 
of decisionmaking processes). 
171.  “When the public has not participated meaningfully in the 
proceedings (both in an informal and formal sense) leading to [a] pivotal 
[environmental] decision, or series of pivotal decisions, then the decision rests on a 
weakened form of political legitimacy and stability.”  Eileen Gay Jones, Risky 
Assessments: Uncertainties in Science and the Human Dimensions of Environmental 
Decisionmaking, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1997); Salkin, supra 
note 163, at 448 (“Professor Arnold argues that ‘land use planning and regulation 
foster choice, self-determination, and self-definition for local neighborhoods, not 
paternalism that insists that there is a single correct environmental justice goal.”). 
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open-access model as a whole.172  Second, they point to their reliance on 
the durability of their private claims to public lands.173  Third, they evoke 
a more basic reliance concept: that natural resources in the region are 
scarce, and they are relying on particular resources and land uses for 
their livelihoods.174 
The reliance concept evokes the doctrine of estoppel.175  Courts 
crafted the common law theory of promissory or equitable estoppel “to 
address injustices resulting from reliance on a gratuitous promise”176 and 
“to avert a litigant’s contradictory arguments . . . or conflicting 
allegations.”177  Solidified into law during the English Enlightenment era, 
the doctrine reflected an effort to craft an ethical counterbalance to the 
royal and aristocratic class’s mentality that “might makes right.”178  Lord 
Kenyon defined it in an eighteenth century case as the principle “that a 
man should not be permitted to ‘blow hot and cold’ with reference to the 
same transaction, or insist, at different times, on the truth of each of two 
conflicting allegations, according to the promptings of his private 
interests.”179  In a nineteenth century case, Lord Denham explained, 
“where one by his words or conduct willfully causes another to believe 
the existence of a certain state of things and induces him to act on that 
belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded 
from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at 
                                                 
172. E.g., Matt Ford, The Irony of Cliven Bundy’s Unconstitutional 
Stand, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2014/04/the-irony-of-cliven-bundys-unconstitutional-stand/360587/ (quoting Cliven 
Bundy accusing BLM of having “seized access to all of the . . . rights of Clark 
County people that like to go hunting and fishing.  They’ve closed all those things 
down, and we’re here to protest that action.”). 
173. E.g., Klass, supra note 26, at 49.  
174. E.g., Salvador Hernandez, Nicolás Medina Mora & Jason Wells, 
Oregon Sheriff Tells Militia Occupiers to Go Home as Ranchers Surrender, 
BUZZFEEDNEWS (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/salvadorhernandez/ 
militia-group-hoping-to-overthrow-government-occupies-buildi?utm_term=.mdx3pk 
XEj#.ywXWozBd2 (quotations omitted) (Ammon Bundy insisted that the federal 
government had “pushed people into poverty by denying private ranchers full use of 
public lands.”). 
175. Cf. Klass, supra note 26, at 45–46 (quoting Joseph Singer). 
176. Charles Calleros, Cause, Consideration, Promissory Estoppel, and 
Promises Under Deed: What Our Students Should Know about Enforcement of 
Promises in a Historical and International Context, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 83, 86 (2013).  
177. T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in 
Modern Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 377, 384 (2008). 
178. Id. at 384–85.  
179. Id. at 387.  
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the same time.”180  Over the years, the doctrine has evolved, gained 
flexibility, and grown to encompass more diverse scenarios.181  For 
instance, it now may allow for recovery of reliance costs even where 
promises are so indefinite as to be unenforceable.182  Under modern 
American common law, the elements of the doctrine typically include: 
(1) reliance and (2) on a position willfully taken.183 
Established doctrine holds that agencies are very infrequently 
subject to equitable estoppel claims.184  The United States Supreme Court 
has never upheld such a claim against the government.185  Yet, standing 
in tension with this rule, “[o]ne of the most firmly established principles 
in administrative law is that an agency must obey its own rules”—a 
principle known as the Accardi doctrine.186  These two doctrines collide: 
where an agency has violated the Accardi doctrine, the remedy might 
well be a measure resembling a remedy to an estoppel claim.  The 
resulting body of law has been called “incoherent”—and likely 
unavailable to the complainers here.187 
Turning to basic principles, though, two characteristics of the 
regulatory regime give strength to a general theory of reliance supporting 
communities’ entitlement to access public lands.  First, as discussed 
above, agencies and managers do “blow hot and cold” by promising one 
form of law in writing and another in practice.  This is the type of mixed 
messaging that estoppel was designed to guard against and to which the 
Accardi principle could theoretically apply.  If these principles were 
embodied in formal law applicable here, agencies could theoretically be 
“estopped” from further excluding local residents from historical land 
uses. 
                                                 
180. Id. 
181. Calleros, supra note 176, at 86. 
182. Id. 
183. Anenson, supra note 177, at 404. 
184. See Holloway v. United States, 845 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2017) 
(equitable estoppel doctrine used sparingly against the government); McCrory v. 
Administrator of Federal Emergency Management Agency of U.S. Dept. of 
Homeland Sec., 22 F. Supp. 3d 279 (S.D. N.Y. 2014), judgment aff'd, 600 Fed. 
Appx. 807 (2d Cir. 2015) (doctrine of estoppel generally not available against the 
government). 
185. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Relying on Government in Comparison: 
What Can the United States Learn from Abroad in Relation to Administrative 
Estoppel?, 38 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 75, 75 (2015). 
186. RICHARD MURPHY & CHARLES H. KOCH, 1 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 
4:22 (3d ed. 2017); Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable 
Object: Estoppel Remedies for an Agency’s Violation of Its Own Regulations or 
Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653, 655 (1992). 
187. Id. at 743. 
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Second, the regime’s foot-dragging on its path to the proprietary 
model could be seen as a way of tacitly validating users’ reliance on 
access.  Klass has considered a theme in this vein, with a focus on 
adverse possession.188  She argues that although land users’ adverse 
possession claims would fail against the federal government, “one of the 
primary policy reasons behind the doctrine of adverse possession, the 
personhood rationale, may help explain the durability of private claims to 
public property.”189  Specifically, one of the bases of adverse possession 
claims—involving society’s sanction of “title by theft”—is the concept 
that someone in possession of land develops a personal attachment to the 
land, which should then be given priority over the original owner’s now-
weaker attachment based on less productive use of the resource.190  The 
shadow legal regime in western public lands seems to have embraced 
this principle throughout its history: many claims that were originally 
illegal have eventually been rendered legal through formal or informal 
operation of law.191  This tacit embrace of an adverse possession-like 
principle suggests the system seeks to validate use and reliance.  In 
seeking to illuminate the psychological drivers behind Sagebrush Rebel 
conflicts, Klass has observed their rhetoric related to these principles: 
longevity of use, reliance, and the right to a traditional livelihood all 
shaped the narrative surrounding Cliven Bundy’s outrage over 
limitations imposed in 1993 on his ability to graze cattle on public 
lands.192  While not justifying Bundy’s actions, Klass and others also 
noted the Bundy family’s 100 years of grazing on those same lands and 
the BLM’s failure to enforce its own law for twenty years.193 
It is not unheard of for reliance interests to create entitlements to 
uses of public lands.  In a 1938 decision interpreting the then-new Taylor 
Grazing Act, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit acknowledged 
that rights falling short of full-fledged property rights may warrant 
equitable protection.194  The court said: 
 
We recognize that the rights under the Taylor Grazing 
Act do not fall within the conventional category of 
vested rights in property.  Yet, whether they be called 
rights, privileges, or bare licenses, or by whatever name, 
                                                 
188. Klass, supra note 26, at 45. 
189. Id.  
190. Id. 
191. Huber, supra note 39. 
192. Klass, supra note 26, at 49.  
193. Id. 
194. Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
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while they exist they are something of real value to the 
possessors and something which have their source in an 
enactment of the Congress.  The jurisdiction of equity is 
flexible and should not be confined to rigid categories so 
that the granting of an injunction will depend upon 
nomenclature rather than upon substance.195  
 
The court continued: 
 
There are well known situations where equitable 
protection is accorded to rights or interests which do not 
come within the category of vested interests in property.  
Among these are cases involving water rights, both the 
rights recognized under the rule of prior appropriation in 
the Western states and riparian rights.  While the owner 
of a water right has a vested interest in that right, the 
right itself is something less than the full ownership of 
property because it is a right not to the corpus of the 
water but to the use of the water.196 
 
This case highlights the problematic nature of some of the 
rhetoric used to dismiss the complainers’ arguments.  The to-the-letter 
legal interpretations discussed in Section I are advanced as 
counterarguments to assertions of entitlements.  Commentators similarly 
point to the unilateral power federal agencies wield to make decisions 
about access, arguing that users should be grateful to benefit from the 
“largesse” of the federal landlord and insisting that federal lands belong 
to all Americans.197  Yet, perhaps such rhetoric reflects a disregard 
toward the longstanding nature and importance of access to some users.  
While technically correct, this positivist interpretation could be said to 
overlook practice, equity, and the complex nature of property.198   
After the Malheur occupation, University of Idaho law professor 
Stephen Miller sought to illuminate the contrast between the realities of 
                                                 
195. Id. at 315. 
196. Id. 
197. James Huffman, Book Review: ‘A Climate of Crisis’ by Patrick 
Allitt, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052 
702304512504579496060586409. 
198. Cf. Sax, Liberating the PTD, supra note 37, at 187 (“[M]any things 
lacking traditional status as formal property . . . in fact generate expectations quite 
like those that attach to traditional forms of property.”). 
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western life and the law as written, also zeroing in on a reliance theme.  
Recognizing that “species protection has hit this region hard,” he notes:  
 
there are families that have been farming these federal 
lands for generations.  In the weird world of renewable, 
non-compete grazing permits, there are families that 
have grazed federal land for generations but do not own 
it.  There is an odd tenant-farmer reality: some of these 
families have been here for generations but do not own 
any land.  This creates immense hostility, especially 
when new conditions are placed on those permits.199   
 
This once again raises Sax’s views as to how the concept of 
property and the law’s protection of it are more complicated than simple 
title.  In the context of the Medieval commons, Sax remarked: 
 
title was not always sufficient to settle . . . controversies.  
One might have been able to trace a grant back a long 
time, but if common uses incompatible with the grant 
had developed, those uses had to be reckoned with.  The 
more necessary the uses, the stronger the claims of 
justice that attached to the custom.200 
   
This point speaks to the third reliance argument advanced by 
complainers: that they are entitled access to scarce resources because 
they need them.201 
Finally, the concept of “just transitions” is relevant here.202  The 
crux of this theory is that progressions in environmental policy will 
impose burdens on certain sectors, and that workers should not bear 
                                                 
199. Stephen R. Miller, As Bundy’s Malheur Takeover Ends, the Real 
Concerns of Sagebrush Country Ranchers Linger, LAND USE PROF BLOG (Jan. 26, 
2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2016/01/as-bundys-malheur-take 
over- ends-the-real-concerns-of-sagebrush-country-ranchers-linger.html.  
200. Sax, Liberating the PTD, supra note 37, at 191. 
201. Hernandez, Mora & Wells, supra note 174 (discussing Ammon 
Bundy’s claim that ranchers needed the Malheur Refuge resources to stay out of 
poverty). 
202. David J. Doorey, A Law of Just Transitions?: Putting Labor Law to 
Work on Climate Change, 164 OSGOODE LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, Oct. 26, 
2015, at 5, available at http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/164/ 
(brackets in original). 
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disproportionate burdens in those transitions.203  Rather, government 
should ensure a smooth transition for workers through workforce 
development initiatives and other social programs.204  This principle does 
not necessarily find support in formal law, yet policymakers 
begrudgingly recognize it when enough public pressure is applied.205  For 
instance, a federal jobs program was implemented to replace the lost 
wages of lumberers in towns affected by the establishment of Redwoods 
National Park.206  A more recent example is the Obama administration’s 
“Power Plus Plan” for coalfield communities affected by regulations of 
the coal industry.207  When it is recognized, the just transitions doctrine 
connotes the equitable principle that when people’s livelihoods are 
affected by regulations, they are owed some form of compensation. 
 In sum, the Reliance Theory provides more robust contours for 
some of the complainers’ allegations: they want to keep doing things the 
way they have been doing them, and arguably agencies have sent them 
the message that they can, despite what laws directing otherwise might 
say.  These principles buttress the idea that the public lands scenario may 
be unjust to locals, as well as the case for local entitlement to certain 
uses. 
 
C. The Public Trust Doctrine 
 
The final “colorable claim” that can be discerned in complainers’ 
rhetoric turns to the arguments that local communities have a greater 
claim to public lands than the national public as a whole.  The pitting of 
two different “publics” against one another gives rise to the question of 
how conflicting conceptualizations of public ownership might be 
resolved.  Complainers’ advancement of the idea of some informal, 
                                                 
203. Peter Newell & Dustin Mulvaney, The Political Economy of the 
‘Just Transition’, 2 GEOGRAPHICAL J., no. 179, June 2013, at 132, available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259043435_The_Political_Economy_of_th
e_Just_Transition (reviewing background and development of the concept). 
204.  “Just Transition”—Just What Is It?, LABOR NETWORK FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY, http://www.labor4sustainability.org/uncategorized/just-transition-
just-what-is-it/ (last visited May 2, 2017). 
205. 16 U.S.C. §§ 79(g), (k) (2012). 
206. Id. 
207. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,670–71 (Oct. 23, 
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INVESTING IN COAL COMMUNITIES, 
WORKERS, AND TECHNOLOGY: THE POWER+ PLAN (2015), https://perma.c 
c/RJ4S- 9FGV; Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 149. 
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smaller-public superior claim continuously appeals to rhetoric that 
evokes some form of natural law.208  Their arguments sound as if they 
claim local rights based on a conception of a superior, separate, and 
innate public trust entitlement. 
The public trust doctrine is usually discussed in the context of 
advancing environmental stewardship, conservation, or minimally 
commercial public access and enjoyment of natural resources, such as for 
navigation and travel.209  It articulates the duty of a sovereign to protect 
common resources for common use, rather than selling or privatizing 
them.210  The trust is said to stem from natural law, with its innate roots 
dating back to indigenous cultures, the Roman Empire, and medieval 
England.211  In the modern era, while formal public trusts may be created 
through statute or common law, the trust obligation continues to be 
characterized as “natural” and “ancient.”212 
Perhaps surprisingly, the central idea behind the public trust 
doctrine historically was “not particularly aimed at preserving resources 
that we generally denote as environmental.”213  These aspects of the 
public trust bring us back to the Reliance Theory and Sax’s views on the 
complexity of property.  Considered the father of the public trust doctrine 
after planting the seed for its revival in a 1970 article, 214 Sax explained 
                                                 
208. Cf. Hope M. Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale 
They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 393, 394 (2009) (arguing that public trust doctrine is “a 
good legal fiction because it enables new uses of the doctrine to perform a gap-
filling function in the absence of positive law”). 
209. Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998) [hereinafter Rose, Joseph Sax]. 
210. MARY WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW 
ECOLOGICAL AGE 126 (2014). 
211. Id.; cf. Rose, Joseph Sax, supra note 209, at 356 (noting the lack of 
clarity about the doctrine, and confusion as to whether it is substantive, procedural, 
or otherwise). 
212. WOOD, supra note 210, at 125–26; Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. 
Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and 
Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U. CAL. 
DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2012); Rose, Joseph Sax, supra note 209, at 359 (noting that 
public trust doctrine is “only one of several that supported the idea that some 
property inherently belongs to the public”). 
213. Rose, Joseph Sax, supra note 209, at 359. 
214. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources 
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 509–46 (1970) 
[hereinafter Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention].  Rose notes that “Sax seemed to 
change focus” with this article and faced criticism when he “argued that the public 
trust should become a tool for avoiding destabilizing change and for incorporating 
community values in decisions about social as well as ecological resources.  Despite 
the apparent differences in these depictions of the trust, however, they may be closer 
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his view of the public trust’s relationship with reliance and expectations 
a few years later, arguing that the public trust doctrine:  
 
should be employed to help us reach the real issues—
expectations and destabilization—whether the 
expectations are those of private property ownership, of 
a diffuse public benefit from ecosystem protection or of 
a community’s water supply.  The historical lesson of 
customary law is that the fact of expectations rather than 
some formality is central . . . . [W]here title and 
expectations are not congruent, title should carry less 
weight . . . . Where traditional expectations must give 
way to new techniques or new needs, the transition 
should be as evolutionary—rather than revolutionary—
as the new needs permit.215 
 
In other words, Sax believed: (1) that “[t]he essence of property 
law is respect for reasonable expectations”; (2) that expectations not 
recognized with formal title are just as fundamental to property law and 
that “[t]he idea of justice at the root of private property protections calls 
for identification of those expectations which the legal system ought to 
recognize”;216 and (3) that the public trust doctrine’s respect for informal 
expectations serves both to protect those expectations and to keep 
communities stable.217  Sax was also concerned with the relationships 
between communities and property, noting the absence of a modern legal 
definition of “community” and the phenomenon that informal property 
expectations could be a community-wide phenomenon.218  
Sax additionally noted that the doctrine’s roots in Medieval 
England served to incorporate customary law into formal law because 
“ideas of custom, justice and law were inextricably intertwined.”219  
                                                                                                             
than they seem . . . . These two versions of the trust, taken together, suggest that 
Sax’s goal was to loosen the public trust doctrine from its historical connection with 
navigation and waterways, and turn the doctrine instead into a more general device 
for managing change and recognizing community values in diffuse resources.”  
Rose, Joseph Sax, supra note 209, at 355.  
215. Sax, Liberating the PTD, supra note 37, at 192–93. 
216. Id. at 186–87 (emphasis added). 
217. Id. at 187, 188, 191–92 (Historically, “[w]hat brought disputes over 
the commons to crisis was neither title nor custom, taken alone, but the sharp 
disappointment of expectations, continuance of which was perceived as a 
necessity.”). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 189. 
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When resources became scarce and lords sought to limit common rights, 
peasant revolts were not uncommon.220  One such agitator Sax quotes 
sounded quite like a Sagebrush Rebel, “asserting longstanding customary 
use” and declaring: “Let the knights then feel our strength . . . . We can 
go to the woods as we will—to cut the trees and take our pick—to catch 
the fish as they swim—to chase the deer through the forests—to do there 
what we please—in the clearings, waters and trees.”221  Sax did not 
suggest that customary uses could not be wasteful, destructive, or 
otherwise misguided.  Rather, those issues notwithstanding, concepts of 
law and justice evolved to recognize people’s expectations as to those 
uses.222  Also like western public lands, the medieval commons were “a 
fertile source of controversy because their legal status was so often 
buried in a shadowy history of competing claims of title and custom.”223 
Once again, of course, if a community were to raise a local 
public trust claim to federal lands, they would likely lose.  Yet, applying 
the concept here puts more theoretical meat on the bones of the “This is 
ours!” declarations raised by the complainers.  The demand that 
expectations not be frustrated and insisting upon continued local, 
historical land uses could be construed as a form of public trust claim.  
Since public trust uses differ and not all are geared toward conservation 
or recreation, complainers could be said to argue: “Our public’s needs 
and priorities are different from your public’s, and we have a natural 
right to our uses to meet those needs.” 
Scholars agree that the trust exists at the state level, and ample 
authority suggests it exists at the city and county level.224  The prospect 
of a federal trust is somewhat more controversial.225  Perhaps counter-
intuitively, it is not necessarily obvious that federal statutory authority or 
a federal public trust doctrine would automatically preempt state or local 
public trust obligations on public lands.  In the theoretical world where 
                                                 
220. Id. at 189–90. 
221. Id. at 190. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 191. 
224. Robin Kundis Craig, Comparative Guide to the Western States’ 
Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution toward an 
Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 89 (2010) (discussing state-level 
public trust doctrine); Hope M. Babcock, Is Using the Public Trust Doctrine to 
Protect Public Parkland from Visual Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 10 n.55 (2015) (listing cases applying public trust to municipalities 
and counties). 
225. Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust 
Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. 
L. 399 (2015). 
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this dispute is pursued under this framing, the doctrine would be unclear, 
particularly since the hierarchy or possible cotenancies of federal, state, 
and local public trust uses have not been settled.226  Environmental 
attorney Cynthia Carlson has argued that federal preemptive capability 
over state public trusts:  
 
is limited to those instances where uses allowed by the 
state doctrines are in direct conflict with one or more 
purposes of a special use federal property located on 
state public trust lands.  Multiple use federal property 
does not have such a preemptive capability in relation to 
state public trust doctrines . . . [and] federal preemption 
will only occur as the result of a site-specific 
determination of whether a particular state public trust 
use is in conflict with a federal property purpose.227  
 
Finally, some public trust interpretations also support the idea 
that a local public might in fact have greater claims to proximate public 
resources than a national public.  Most discussion of public trust 
beneficiaries refers to “the common citizen,”228 “the public as a 
whole,”229 “the public as well as future generations,”230 “the world’s 
peoples,”231 “present and future global citizenry,”232 and “present and 
future generations.”233  But other characterizations exist.  In the germinal 
case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois in 1892, the United States 
Supreme Court referred to “the people of the State” as the beneficiaries 
of the resources at issue.234  The Court used the same characterization in 
Geer v. Connecticut.235  In Arnold v. Mundy and subsequent decisions, 
courts held that state ownership of oysters in trust by the State of New 
                                                 
226. WOOD, supra note 210, at 213. 
227. Cynthia Carlson, Federal Property and the Preemption of State 
Public Trust Doctrines, 20 ENVTL L. REP. 10003 (1990). 
228. Craig, supra note 224, at 89. 
229. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the 
Attorney General as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57, 66 (2005). 
230. Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing 
Rights and Integrating Standards, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 702–703 (2006). 
231. WOOD, supra note 210, at 214 (quoting Peter Sand). 
232. Id. at 217. 
233. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
234. Ill. C. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
235. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896), overruled on other 
grounds, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
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Jersey meant that a statute prohibiting nonresidents from harvesting 
oysters did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.236  State or local public trusts could, then, have 
different beneficiaries than a national public trust.237 
This discussion does not seek to delve too deeply into the 
technical merits of a formal legal argument based on this theory.  Rather, 
it seeks to show that local residents are not necessarily outrageous or 
incorrect in their belief that they have some greater right to federally 
managed public resources than the public at large.  This discussion 
provides a slightly more sophisticated and legally palatable 
articulation—a “liberal construction”—of the less nuanced arguments 
advanced by the complainers. 
The sum of all of these theories reflects a general injustice in 
western land management based on lack of democracy—specifically 
related to arbitrariness, lack of local input, lack of recognition of 
reliance, and a variety of complex normative clashes.  The Sagebrush 
Rebels gesture at these ideas, albeit inelegantly and violently.  While 
they are highly imperfect messengers who fail to articulate complaints 
with credibility, something ethically significant can be derived from the 
symbolic function of their outrage about western land management.  
Milder manifestations of similar sympathies, such as those expressed by 
frustrated local government officials, risk being dismissed along with 
dismissal of Sagebrush Rebel rhetoric.  This liberal construction of local 
concerns suggests the presence of ethical problems that stand to be 
righted.   
 
IV.  REMEDIES 
 
A robust body of literature has explored how local-federal 
collaboration can be improved.238  In seeking to illuminate the ethically 
and legally principled impetus for that improvement, this discussion may 
also inform the mechanisms for achieving it.  In Alienation and 
Reconciliation, I argued that the Bundys’ occupation at Malheur was an 
ironic choice because Malheur actually serves as a case study of 
successful, multi-scalar social-ecological systems management that 
reconciles diverse, potentially conflicting interests through extensive and 
                                                 
236. Kanner, supra note 229, at 69. 
237. Cf. John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution 
Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part II-Environmental Rights and 
Public Trust, 104 DICK. L. REV. 97, 124 (1999) (characterizing trust beneficiaries as 
“including people living near or using the lands in question”). 
238. E.g., Fellman, supra note 4, at 87, 105. 
EISENBERG PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/24/2017 7:58 PM 
 
  
100 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 38 
 
 
intimate local-federal collaboration on the Refuge’s Comprehensive 
Conservation Plan.239  The model illustrated at Malheur also stands to 
address the theories raised here, with its implementation on other public 
lands potentially serving to “remedy” the complainers’ concerns.  
Specifically, the model addresses the three theories expounded above—
the Exclusion Theory, the Reliance Theory, and the Public Trust 
Theory—because it involved intimately collaborative processes that 
constitute an adaptive governance approach, requiring stakeholders to 
engage one another, exchange information, adjust outcomes, and seek 
consensus.   
First, the Malheur-adaptive governance model stands to address 
the Exclusion Theory because it is inclusive.  The three-year 
collaborative decisionmaking process at Malheur brought local residents 
into the regulatory regime and reduced “reverse environmental justice” 
concerns by providing them with an opportunity for meaningful input 
into land use outcomes while also validating their diverse experiences—
both allowing them to actually influence outcomes, and helping to repair 
their trust in the decisionmaking apparatus itself.240  The model stands to 
mitigate the concerns behind the Reliance Theory for similar reasons: 
residents’ participation in planning processes allowed them to advocate 
their reliance interests in that decisionmaking, resulting in a more 
balanced approach to how conflicting uses were reconciled.241  Finally, to 
the extent a “local public trust” and local public trust beneficiaries might 
conflict with other statutory or public trust parameters, the collaborative 
decisionmaking process facilitates reconciliation by allowing locals’ 
vision for their natural resource uses to be incorporated into 
decisionmaking.  This incorporation in turn validates whatever 
entitlement to the resources their “localness” may afford them.  The 
Malheur model also seems to comport with Sax’s vision for public trust 
management, which he hoped could serve as “a vehicle to ensure the 
democratization of natural resource decisionmaking,” better taking into 
account “issues affecting the poor and consumer groups” as well as 
“problems of equality in the political and administrative process.”242 
The existing legal framework in NEPA, FLPMA, and agencies’ 
organic acts would be a workable starting point for enabling these 
                                                 
239. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 137–45. 
240. Id. at 139–45. 
241. Id. at 141 (discussing reconciliation of grazing uses with 
conservation priorities). 
242. Sax, Effective Judicial Interpretation, supra note 214, at 557. 
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processes.243  Working within these frameworks could also mitigate 
concerns about the legality of certain collaborative procedures.244  
Michelle Bryan argues that the framework can be improved through 
several straightforward steps which are consistent with this discussion.  
First, Bryan recommends implementation of a standardized planning 
approach across agencies and formulation of mutual cultural and 
technical literacy to help working relationships, such as by reconsidering 
terms such as “nonsignificant.”245  Bryan also recommends 
implementation of measures to provide actual empowerment for 
community input, including “a guarantee of early and meaningful 
involvement” in agency planning for local governments—noting that 
officials “can tell the difference between genuine and artificial inclusion 
in federal planning processes.” 246 Last, Bryan calls for consideration of 
existing boundaries, including local government boundaries, in the 
creation of federal agency planning areas.247  Protections should, of 
course, be put in place to ensure that powerful constituencies do not 
steamroll other voices.248   
The theories considered in this discussion suggest that enabling 
and implementing a system of collaboration like that seen in the Malheur 
model and in other successful case studies is not just a nice thing to do.249  
Rather, a normative case rooted in ethical and legal principle supports the 
need for such changes.  But perhaps more importantly, this discussion 
provides an impetus and model for engagement that could apply in a 
variety of contexts in the country today.  Anti-government, anti-
environmental populist sentiment is not an incurable disease.  The norms 
and processes discussed here generally suggest that seeking to surmount 
                                                 
243. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 145 (discussing Craig and Ruhl’s 
Model Adaptive Management Procedure Act and the potential that “Malheur’s 
significance may . . . lie in a discipline other than administrative law”). 
244. Cf. id. at 86–89; Robert D. Comer, Cooperative Conservation: The 
Federalism Underpinnings to Public Involvement in the Management of Public 
Lands, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133, 1133–58 (2004). 
245. Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 2, 14–16. 
246. Id.; see also Fellman, supra note 4, at 82 (discussing best practices 
for collaborative conservation). 
247. Bryan, Cause for Rebellion?, supra note 5, at 2, 14–16. 
248. Cf. Fellman, supra note 4, at 83 (noting concern that collaboration 
should not replace NEPA and “does not include ‘negotiated political deals . . . 
behind closed doors[,] deal making, or other processes that are not open, transparent, 
and strive to be inclusive’”). 
249. See generally id. (discussing Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership and 
other case studies, and arguing that these examples revealed some successes). 
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cultural and rhetorical blind spots in order to engage rather than exclude 
may stand to reduce alienation, conflict, and polarization. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This discussion aims to illustrate that some Western residents’ 
outrage about federal lands management, often embodied in the less-
than-perfect symbol of the Sagebrush Rebellion, is less irrational and 
more grounded in legal and ethical principle than is typically recognized.  
Some reticence to discuss these issues is unsurprising in light of the 
overpowering need for conservation and biodiversity interests to take 
priority in the age of climate change, as well as concerns about 
unfettered parochialism and certain movements’ murky motivations.  
Yet, from a standpoint rooted in ethics, legal principles embraced by our 
system of law, and pragmatism, it would behoove scholars and land 
managers to consider these angles more deeply.  Incorporating the 
principles discussed here may well lead to reduced tensions and 
improved outcomes in the West, but those principles also reflect a more 
“fair” and ethically correct approach to public lands management.   
 
 
